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Driven by the fact that the global oil market has become extremely volatile and the EU dependence on 
oil continues to grow, this paper argues that with more emphasis on renewable energy and by using 
domestically produced alternative energy sources instead of importing foreign oil the EU Member 
States would drastically improve their energy security and energy independence. The study investigates 
both past and present trends in the EU energy sources supply and consumption patterns. Additionally, 
the paper considers possibilities of the renewable and alternative energy both at the current stage and 
future development of this sector in the EU. The research findings confirm the initial hypothesis as to 
whether the share of alternative and renewable energy will be sufficiently large to contribute to solving 
a problem of the EU energy security and independency. The role of the renewables in national energy 
security strategies of three EU Member States is studied and government supporting policies that 
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Alternative and Renewable energy  policy in Europe 
Motivation: 
Threat of lack of necessary resources such as oil and gas today, is becoming ever more real for many 
countries. In the energy strategy of the state, both in the short and in the long run as one of the main 
components indicated the need to ensure energy security and an effective energy security policy, 
regulation and coordination of performing energy sector development in its entirety from the 
evaluation, exploration to production resources. Changes in the global energy market and even the 
probability of an energy crisis affect the economy of the European Union, which at the largest 
production capacity in the world has the lowest own production of traditional energy sources. Thus, in 
order to maintain economic growth and prosperity of the European region, it needs to ensure 
uninterrupted access to energy. 
In this thesis I would like to identify the role of alternative and renewable energy in the general 
strategy of energy security of EU. 
Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. The share of alternative energy will be sufficiently large to contribute to solving a 
problem of energy security and dependency. 
Hypothesis 2. Renewable energy sources will reduce dependency of European Union on Russia fossil 
fuels. 
Methodology: 
This paper studies alternative and renewable energy policy in European counties. For empirical 
analyzing I use such methodological approaches as comparative analysis and analysis of secondary 
statistical data, analysis of legal regulations.  
Outline: 
1. Introduction 
2. The energy security  problem of European countries  
2.1 The EU provision of energy sources  
2.2 Possibilities of alternative and renewable energy at the modern  stage 
3.   Potential  of  EU energy policy to tackle energy security problems  
       3.1 Evolution of energy policy   
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       3.2 New trends in EU energy policy 
       3.3 The role of renewable energy sources in the energy strategy of EU Member States 
3.3.1. Germany 
3.3.2. France  
3.3.3. Spain 
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Earlier ghostly and distant threat of lack of necessary resources such as oil and gas nowadays is 
becoming ever more real for many countries. In the energy strategy of the state both in the short and in 
the long run as one of the main components indicated is the need to ensure energy security and 
effective energy security policy, regulation and coordination of performing energy sector development 
in its entirety from the evaluation, exploration to production resources. Changes in the global energy 
market and even the probability of an energy crisis affect the economy of the European Union, which at 
the largest production capacity in the world has the lowest own production of traditional energy 
sources. Thus, in order to maintain its economic growth and prosperity, the European region needs to 
ensure uninterrupted access to energy, as well as the reliability and security of the energy supply.  
Growing demand for energy along with increasing prices of energy make the topic of energy 
security extremely relevant nowadays, raising concerns regarding a variety of issues, most of which are 
associated with the reliability and affordability of energy supply. Since Europe is highly dependent on a 
limited number of energy sources suppliers, it raises high risks for the energy supply security of these 
countries. This problem may be even worsened by taking into considerations such factors as political 
tense and military conflicts in the world that have direct influence on energy prices and supply. Risks to 
national energy security can also lead to negative effects on energy security at local levels. Recently, 
the perception that dependence on Russian gas leads to unacceptable geopolitical risks in relation to 
countries‘ national security becomes more relevant, which makes the EU undertake measures in order 
to secure its energy sector.  
In addition to this, nowadays energy system is highly carbon-intensive and depends on a finite 
supply of fossil fuels that are getting harder and more expensive to extract, which raises concerns about 
national energy security in many countries, particularly in the EU. Furthermore, the modern state of the 
energy sector is complicated and many countries are exposed to large swings in oil import prices and 
also costs in terms of billions in public subsidies. Therefore, renewable and alternative energy sources 
such as wind power, solar energy, hydropower, biofuels and natural gas in compressed or 
liquefied form can play a major role in tackling the twin challenge of energy security and global 
warming because they do not deplete and produce less greenhouse-gas emissions than fossil fuels.  
Since the EU in its policies addresses climate issues, in many regards its energy and environmental 
objectives go hand in hand. 
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Another side of the problem under study is the fact that most renewable and alternative energy 
industries are still young, so that these industries face low demand from consumers, and additionally, a 
severe competition from other well-established energy industries such as the coal and nuclear 
industries. Moreover, the production of clean energy also possesses high launching and operating costs. 
Companies in many undeveloped renewable energy industries find it very difficult to recover these 
high costs over the lifecycle of a facility, even though such lifecycles can last decades. 
With a view to this issue, all EU countries have adopted national renewable energy action 
plans showing what actions they intend to take to meet their renewables targets. These plans include 
sectorial targets for electricity, heating and cooling, and transport, planned policy measures, mixes of 
renewables technologies they expect to employ and cooperation mechanisms. As strong growth in 
renewable energy capacity in Europe shows, wise government policies and encouraging incentives can 
have a real impact on the fortunes of these technologies. 
With regard to the abovementioned problems and policies described, this paper aims to analyze 
current EU energy situation and verify two main hypotheses. First hypothesis is whether the share of 
alternative and renewable energy will be sufficiently large to contribute to solving a problem of the EU 
energy security and independency. Second hypothesis is whether renewable energy sources will reduce 
dependency of the EU and its Member States on Russia and other fossil fuel exporters.  
The thesis will be based mostly on the empirical analysis, using both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. The first hypothesis will be tested with the help of analysis of quantitative data provided 
by the most recent reports of various energy-related organizations along with the comprehensive study 
of the outlooks and projections for separate types of energy for the distant future. Moreover, the study 
of legal documents related to the EU energy field will be conducted in order to identify the framework 
of the renewable and alternative energy development both now and in the long term. The second 
hypothesis will be tested with the help of data analysis and such methodological tools as statistical and 
comparative analysis, analysis of legal regulations and case studies (Germany, France, Spain). The 
author aims at conducting a comprehensive analysis of the current situation on the EU energy market 
with respect to energy security and sustainability aspects, as well as investigates the outlooks and 
targets for energy sector development within the EU. Based on the obtained findings, the author will 
argue the validity of the initial hypotheses. The literature used for the research contains the most recent 
reports by the organizations and authorities related to the energy sector of the EU, as well as includes 
books, articles and publications of the researchers and professionals in the field, and finally it also 
contains primary sources of the EU legislation. 
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Based on the outlined motivation and hypotheses, this research approaches the study of 
renewable and alternative energy sources in the EU in the following way. First the EU provision of 
energy sources will be investigated as well as the possibilities of alternative energy sources will be 
outlined thereby identifying energy security problems of the European Union member countries. 
Furthermore, a retrospective analysis of the EU energy policy as well as its new trends and the role of 
renewable and alternative energy sources in the energy strategy of three EU Member States will be 
investigated. Countries' strategies differ when it comes to supporting fossil fuels, so the renewable 
sector must compete with a unique price structure for these fuels in each country, therefore energy 
strategies of France, Germany and Spain will be analyzed separately.  
The task of the paper is not only to describe past and present situation on the EU energy market, 
but also to assess governmental policies of the EU in general and in some countries separately, 
highlight crucial issues with respect to energy security and efficiency, evaluate support provided to the 
renewable sector within the EU and finally outline some perspectives of the energy sector development 
taking main renewable energy subsectors into account. In order to spur sustained investment in 
renewable energy, a clear, long-term policy perspective is necessary. Therefore, the analysis of future 
trends is of great interest, since the EU sets goals for a distant future, i.e. up till 2020, 2030 and 2050, 
so the analysis of current and future trends is highly relevant. 
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2. THE ENERGY SECURITY PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
2.1 THE EU PROVISION OF ENERGY SOURCES  
 
According to the general principles of energy policy published by the European Parliament, 
challenges facing the EU in the field of energy include the following important issues: increasing 
import dependency, limited diversification, high and volatile energy prices, growing global energy 
demand, security risks affecting producing and transit countries, the growing threats of climate change, 
slow progress in energy efficiency, challenges posed by the increasing share of renewables, and the 
need for increased transparency, further integration and interconnection on energy markets (EU 
Parliament, 2014). 
The most important issue with respect to the EU energy security is the problem of import 
dependency. Following the most recent evidence provided by the European Commission, the EU 
imports more than half of all the energy it consumes. Its import dependency is particularly high for 
crude oil (more than 90%) and natural gas (66%). The total import bill is more than €1 billion per day. 
(EC, 2014a)  
In addition to this, many EU member countries are also heavily reliant on a single supplier, 
including some that rely entirely on Russia for their natural gas. This dependence leaves them 
vulnerable to supply disruptions, which can be caused by political or commercial disputes, or 
infrastructure failure. For instance, a 2009 gas dispute between Russia and transit-country Ukraine, left 
many EU countries with severe shortages (EC, 2014b). Current political situation in the Eastern 
Ukraine and Russia involvement into it strengthen the belief that the EU and its member countries 
should find alternative sources of energy supply in order to ensure the stability of the EU internal 
energy market.   
A variety of measures aiming to achieve an integrated energy market, security of energy supply 
and sustainability of the energy sector are at the core of the European Union energy policy (EU 
Parliament, 2014). Moreover, in response to the aforementioned concerns, the European Commission 
released its Energy Security Strategy in May 2014. The Strategy aims to ensure a stable and abundant 
supply of energy for European citizens and the economy. (EC, 2014b) 
Before considering the policy implication issues, it is worth analyzing the EU provision of energy 
resources in order to define main strengths and weaknesses of the market with further analysis of its 
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impact on the security issues. Thus, according to Eurostat statistics, the production of primary energy in 
the EU-28 totaled 794.3 million toe in 2012. This continued the generally downward trend observed in 
recent years, with 2010 the main exception as production rebounded after a relatively strong fall in 
2009 that coincided with the financial and economic crisis. When viewed over a longer period, the 
production of primary energy in the EU-28 was 15.7 % lower in 2012 than it had been a decade earlier. 
The general downward trend of EU-28 production may, at least in part, be attributed to supplies of raw 
materials becoming exhausted and/or producers considering the exploitation of limited resources 
uneconomical (Eurostat, 2014b).  
The highest level of primary energy production among the EU member states was in France, with 
a 16.8 % share of the EU-28 total, followed by Germany (15.6 %) and the United Kingdom (14.6 %). 
Compared with a decade earlier the main change was the fall in the share of the United Kingdom, down 
from 27.1 %. The only other member states whose shares fell over this period were Denmark (-0.6 
percentage points) and Lithuania (-0.4 percentage points). In absolute terms, the largest expansions in 
the production of primary energy during the 10 years to 2012 were registered in Italy and Sweden (both 
up 4.4 million toe), and the Netherlands (up 4.3 million toe) (Eurostat, 2014b).  
Having considered some general statistical evidence, it is worthwhile to carry out a dynamic 
analysis of the development of production and consumption trends within the EU and conduct a 
comparative analysis of the results. I start with the investigation of primary production of energy 
sources inside the EU-28 and gross inland consumption within the EU-28 along the period 2004-2013. 
The trends, based on the Eurostat data, are plotted on the graph below.  
 
 
Fig.1. EU-28 inland total production and total consumption of energy sources, in thousand TOE 




According to the graph, it is easy to see that the primary production of energy sources is lower 
than the consumption and the gap between the two has to be covered by imports. Moreover, what is 
also visible from the graph, the primary production of energy sources has somewhat declined in the EU 
during last four years and the inland consumption seems not to be increasing. Therefore, this finding 
explicitly shows the necessity of the EU‘s import of fuels in order to satisfy needs in energy. The aim 
of this paper is therefore to identify whether the share of renewable and alternative energy sources 
could be large enough in order to sufficiently cover the gap between demand and supply of energy 
sources in the EU. 
However, the EU-28 is too heavily dependent on fossil fuels, which accounted in 2012 for 74.6% 
of the total gross inland energy consumption compared to renewables at only 11%. The data provided 
in the latest 2015 report published by the European Environment Agency (EEA) evidences that the 
share of fossil fuels (gas, solid fuels and oil) in the total gross inland energy consumption of the EU-28 
declined from 83% in 1990 to 74.6% in 2012 at an annual rate of 0.3 % per year. Between 2005 and 
2012, the share of fossil fuels in gross inland energy consumption decreased slightly faster at 0.6 % per 
year (EEA, 2015a).  Based on this evidence we can see that there is some potential for the renewable 
and alternative energy sources to overtake a gap between supply and demand and thereby substitute 
import of fossil fuels from abroad. At least the data provided above evidences that since the EU started 
an active renewable-enhancing policy, the share of fossil fuels in total energy consumption has 
decreased, which is a good sign for future development. 
This was a description of the broad picture and general trends in the EU provision of energy 
resources. Next, it is also important to distinguish where this import-dependence comes from, namely 
whether the EU countries import from each other and/or their sources of supply are very diversified, 
which would not constitute a problem here or create threats to internal market energy security, or 
whether they import from non-EU countries from a rather limited number of suppliers, in which case 
the energy security issue is likely to arise. The investigation of this issue will help in the process of 
validation of the initial hypotheses of this study.  
As reported by Eurostat, the downturn in the primary production of hard coal, lignite, crude oil, 
natural gas and more recently nuclear energy led to a situation where the EU was increasingly reliant 
on primary energy imports in order to satisfy demand, although this situation stabilized in the aftermath 
of the financial and economic crisis. The EU-28‘s imports of primary energy exceeded exports by some 
922.8 million toe in 2012. The largest net importers of primary energy were generally the most 
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populous EU Member States, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Poland. Since 2004, the 
only net exporter of primary energy among the member states has been Denmark (Eurostat, 2014b).  
Following the data of the report by EEA, we can see that the EU‘s dependence on imports of 
fossil fuels from non-EU countries remained relatively stable between 2005 and 2012. In 2012, EU-28 
net import of fossil fuels was 53.4% of its total gross inland energy consumption with 58.2% for oil, 
28.3% for gas and 13.6% for solid fuels (data provided as a share of fuel-specific gross inland 
consumption of a particular source). In 2012 only 71.4% of the total gross inland energy consumption 
in the EU-28 reached the end users (EEA, 2015a).   
The graph below based on data provided by Eurostat shows that the imports of all types of fuels 
constitutes a huge amount of fuels consumption. All products is the sum of net import of solid fuels, 
gas and total petroleum products as a percentage of total gross inland consumption of all products. 
 
 
Fig.2. Net import as a share of fuel-specific gross inland consumption, in percentages 
Source: Eurostat 
 
In addition to fossil fuels, the EU imports uranium for its nuclear power industry which 
accounted in 2012 for about 38% of the world's civil nuclear power generation. The EU industry has 
the capacity for uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication, but is dependent on imported uranium. 
Nevertheless, the situation is somewhat better (with respect to the diversity of supply) than for most 
fossil fuels, due to the wide distribution of uranium around the globe, in geopolitically stable areas. In 
2012, 27% of uranium delivered to utilities in EU-28 originated from Russia, 17% from Canada, 13% 
from Niger, 12% from Australia and another 12% from Kazakhstan (EEA, 2015a). 
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Taking a closer look at the nuclear energy sector in the EU, it can be mentioned that according to 
the World Nuclear Association there are 131 nuclear power reactors operating in 14 of the 28 EU 
member states account for over one-quarter of the electricity generated in the whole of the EU. Half of 
the EU‘s nuclear electricity is produced in only one country – France. The 53 units operating in three 
non-EU countries (Russia, Ukraine and Switzerland) account for about 17% of the electricity in the rest 
of Europe. Norway and Switzerland are effectively part of the EU synchronous grid. In 2013 about 
43% of EU uranium came from Kazakhstan and Canada, followed by Russia, Niger and Australia 
(World Nuclear Association, 2015). 
Despite the fact that establishment and operation of power generating capacity is undertaken on a 
national basis, the electricity is mostly traded across national boundaries in the EU, which leads to the 
fact that a particular country‘s energy policies have significant implications for its neighbors.  
As reported by the World Nuclear Association, in spite of the fact that nuclear is a proven source 
of low-carbon, dispatchable electricity giving a high degree of energy security and provides 53% of the 
EU‘s carbon-free electricity, the sector today faces major challenges within the EU (World Nuclear 
Association, 2015). This happens due to the fact that some member states are strongly anti-nuclear, and 
electricity markets are often structured in response to support renewables nowadays.  
The same organization argues that in the period to 2030, nuclear capacity that will be lost due to 
the closure of a number of reactors – either because they have reached the end of their operating 
lifetimes or due to political interference – is expected to outweigh that gained from new reactors. A 
slight decrease from the current EU nuclear capacity of 122 GWe is therefore expected in the near term 
as reported by the Nuclear Association. Total EU generating capacity in 2011 was 903 GWe, almost 
one-third of this in Germany and France (World Nuclear Association, 2015). 
It is also important to mention that nuclear plant construction is currently underway in only three 
EU member states – Finland, France and Slovakia. These construction projects have all experienced 
cost overruns and delays. Further new units likely to come online before 2030 are planned or plausibly 
proposed in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and the United 
Kingdom. According to the report by the World Nuclear Association, the long-term future of nuclear 
power in the EU is likely to depend on the outcome of these projects, which are relatively few in 
number – in total less than planned in Russia (World Nuclear Association, 2015). 
It is worth taking a brief look at the trend of import dependence on Russia energy sources supply 
development, since identification of this trend could help to understand how this issue evolved over 
time. Moreover, according to the second initial hypothesis of my study, it is important to explore the 
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patterns of the EU dependence on Russia‘s import in order to be able to argue that the renewables will 
be able to constitute the amounts of energy needs currently covered by Russia.   
Figure 3 below depicts the development of the import of all energy sources by the EU-28 from 
Russia. It is obvious that the trend has been steadily increasing with a somewhat rapid a slightly 
significant decrease in absolute values between 2008 and 2009. This is likely to have been caused by 
the worldwide economic crisis. It is also noticeable that after decreasing in 2008 this trend has been 
more or less stable and did not return back to its pre-crisis level. It is important to mention that a 2009 
gas dispute between Russia and transit-country Ukraine, left many EU countries with severe shortages, 
which may have also added to this decrease in imports. The aforementioned explanations may indicate 
that the EU countries decided to reevaluate their energy supply security issues and since 2008 
maintained the imports from Russia on a steady level.  
 
 
Fig.3. Imports from Russia to the EU-28, all products, in thousand TOE 
Source: author‘s calculations based on Eurostat data 
 
Russia, and specifically Gazprom, is the largest single supplier of gas to European countries. 
According to the study conducted by Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, in 2013 Gazprom exported a 
record volume of gas to Europe, significantly exceeding deliveries in the 2008– 2012 period and, due to 
a fall in European demand and deliveries from other indigenous and external suppliers, representing 
34% and 30% respectively of European imports and demand. 
As reported by the same research, the vast majority of Russian gas exports to Europe are sold on 
long-term contracts varying from 10 to 35 years in length. These contracts, which are legally binding 
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and subject to international arbitration, contain take-or-pay clauses which require buyers to pay for a 
minimum annual quantity of gas, irrespective of whether they take that quantity. In the post-2008 
period, the take-or-pay level in many of these contracts was reduced from 85 to 70%.  
It should be highlighted that these contracts are designed in such a way that there are significant 
limitations on the options to reduce the volumes in these contracts or regarding terminations of the 
contracts before expiry. Up till now, despite difficult renegotiations and a large number of arbitration 
proceedings, no such actions have been reported (Dickel et al.,2014).  
Therefore, as can be seen from this evidence, the dependence on Russian fossil fuels is not only 
in terms of energy supply but also in terms of commitment and inflexibility of the contracts signed. All 
these factors trigger threats for the EU energy security and create firm grounds for promotion of the 
renewable and alternative energy sources. The aforementioned data and contractual commitments also 
evidence against the possibility of renewable and alternative energy sources to substitute imports from 
Russia to a great extent and at least until 2020.  
Nevertheless, not only economic factors matter with respect to this issue. The Russian reaction to 
political events in Ukraine in 2014, and specifically its annexation of Crimea, military involvement in 
eastern Ukraine, and the Malaysian airlines MH17 disaster, has generated a great deal of commentary 
about European dependence on Russian energy in general and natural gas in particular. Additionally to 
these events, some price dispute evolved which led to termination of Russian supplies to Ukraine in 
June 2014, and the possibility of interruptions of gas supplies to Europe (Dickel et al., 2014). This 
situation and speculations performed by the Russian authorities reminded Europe about 2009 problems 
and signified the unreliability of Russia as energy supplier for the EU. Thus, all this led to renewed 
calls for diversification of European gas supplies and reduction of Russian imports. 
In order to sum up the issue of the EU import dependence on Russia, the graph below is 
provided. The figure shows a simple dependence chart with European imports of Russian gas (adjusted 
to European units) plotted against European demand for the period 1990–2013. As can be seen from 
the time series data, it is clear that the share of imports was relatively steady (in the range of 20–25%) 
until 2013, when European demand fell and Russian exports increased, at which point it reached 28%  




Fig.4. Share of Russian gas in European demand 1990–2013 (bcm and %)  
Source: Dickel et al., 2014 
 
According to the Eurostat data, the origin of EU-28 energy imports has changed somewhat in 
recent years, as Russia has maintained its position as the main supplier of crude oil and natural gas and 
emerged as the leading supplier of solid fuels. In 2012, some 33.7 % of the EU-28‘s imports of crude 
oil were from Russia, slightly below the shares recorded for 2010 (34.7 %) and 2011 (34.8 %). Russia 
became the principal supplier of solid fuels in 2006. Russia‘s share of EU-28 solid fuels imports rose 
from 13.1 % in 2002 to 30.0 % by 2009, before falling somewhat to 25.9 % by 2012. Despite this 
contraction, Russia remained the primary source of solid fuels imports into the EU in 2012 (Eurostat, 
2014b).  
These data evidences that in order to satisfy the second initial hypothesis of this paper as to 
whether renewable energy sources will reduce dependency of the EU and its Member States on Russia 
and other fossil fuel exporters, the EU and its Member States should work more actively on switching 
to alternative and renewable energy and sharply increasing their share in the energy mix, thereby 
reducing volumes of fossil fuels supply from Russia. 
In its May 2014 Communication on European Energy Security Strategy, the European 
Commission summarized dependence on Russian gas as follows: ―Six Member States depend from 
Russia as single external supplier for their entire gas imports and three of them use natural gas for more 
than a quarter of their energy needs. In 2013 energy supplies from Russia accounted for 39% of EU 
natural gas imports or 27% of EU gas consumption‖ (EC, 2014b, p.2). 
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It is, however, important to emphasize that the net dependence on fuel imports varies 
significantly across the EU member states. This in its turn reflects differences in the availability of 
indigenous fossil resources and renewables. In addition to this, the level of crude oil import reflects the 
availability of refining capacity and direct production of final products. Therefore, for some countries 
there is limited or no refining capacity, as in case of Luxembourg, and hence only final products are 
imported (EEA, 2012). 
Having considered the EU home production of energy sources as well as trends in imports of the 
resources especially from Russia, it is now appropriate to analyze another important issue under the 
problem of the EU provision of energy sources. This issue is the EU provision of the renewable energy 
sources. This aspect will be more comprehensively investigate in next sections, but a brief overview is 
needed here as well in order to complete the analysis of the issue under study in this section, i.e. the EU 
provision of energy sources. 
Let‘s now turn directly to the production side of renewables inside the EU. Thus, according to 
data from Eurostat, the primary production of renewable energy within the EU-28 in 2012 was 177.3 
million toe — a 22.3 % share of total primary energy production from all sources. The quantity of 
renewable energy produced within the EU-28 increased overall by 81.3 % between 2002 and 2012, 
equivalent to an average increase of 6.1 % per year (Eurostat, 2014a). These data evidence that wise 
support policies by the governments helped the EU Member States to increase the production of their 
own energy, which is a good starting point for reducing their dependence on Russia and other foreign 
fossil fuels suppliers, thereby these data contributes to the validity of the second initial hypothesis 
stated in the beginning of this study. 
There are, however, uneven trends among the EU Member states in developing the renewable 
energy sources. Thus, the largest producer of renewable energy within the EU-28 in 2012 was 
Germany, with an 18.6 % share of the total; France (11.7 %), Sweden (10.4 %) and Italy (10.1 %) were 
the only other EU Member States to record double-digit shares (Eurostat, 2014a).  These data evidence 
in favor of our initial hypotheses, since this trend demonstrates that the above mentioned countries are 
the main driving forces within the EU in terms of renewable and alternative energy implementations, 
which means that their successful example is likely to positively influence rest of the EU Member 
states, thereby sufficiently increasing the share of alternative and renewables in the energy mix and 
reducing the import dependence on foreign countries in the long run.  
There were considerable differences in the renewable energy mix across the Member States, 
which reflect to a large degree natural endowments and climatic conditions. For example, more than 
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62.5 % of the renewable energy produced in Cyprus was from solar energy, while more than a third of 
the renewable energy in the relatively mountainous countries of Austria, Slovenia and Croatia was 
from hydropower. More than 27.7 % of the renewable energy production in Italy was from geothermal 
energy sources  due to active volcanic processes happening there. The share of wind power was 
particularly high in Ireland (46.3 %) and also accounted for more than 20% of renewable energy 
production in Portugal, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Spain. The output of renewable energy in 
Malta grew at an average rate of 22.7 % per year between 2002 and 2012, although the absolute level 
of output remained by far the lowest in the EU-28. Over this same period, annual increases averaging 
in excess of 10.0 % were recorded for Belgium, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom, with 
Luxembourg and Cyprus just below this level (Eurostat, 2014a). 
Having overviewed the production aspect of the renewable energy in the EU, it is now important 
to consider the consumption side of the issue. Thus, according to the European commission and the 
data from Eurostat, renewable energy sources accounted for an 11.0 % share of the EU-28‘s gross 
inland energy consumption in 2012. Over one third of the energy consumed in Sweden (37.2 %) and 
Latvia (36.4 %) was derived from renewables in 2012, while the relative importance of renewables was 
also high in Austria (30.1 %), Finland (29.2 %) and Denmark (23.3 %) (Eurostat, 2014a). 
It can be highlighted that after a period up to 2010 during which renewables were growing 
strongly, the combined effect of warm weather, slower progress by Member States in implementing the 
Renewable Energy Directive and Europe‘s faltering economic situation led to a decrease in the use of 
renewable energy in 2011. However, the share of renewable sources in gross final consumption of 
energy did increase, since the consumption of fossil fuel energy fell more than that of renewables. In 
2012 the share of energy from renewable sources increased again and reached 14.3 % and increased 
further to 15.0 % in 2013 (Eurostat, 2015a).  
It is noteworthy to point out that according to the EEA report on energy support measures in EEA 
countries and innovation in the renewable sector,  in  total 582 support measures have been identified 
that were in place in 2012 in the 32 EEA countries (vast majority of which are the EU Member States). 
Of the total 582 measures, 310 are associated with fossil fuels, and 236 with renewable energy 
(including biofuels), representing 40.5 % of the identified support measures. About 6% of the identified 
support measures were targeted at electricity and/or heat production and consumption, and therefore 
did not alter the competitive situation between renewables and fossil fuels (EEA, 2015b). Figure 5 





Fig.5. Distribution of energy support measures, 2012, EEA-32 
Source: EEA, 2015b, p.15  
 
As can be seen from Figure 5, in 2012, EEA countries had in place more measures to support 
fossil fuels and nuclear than to support renewable energy. This is particularly due to the desire to keep 
certain economic sectors competitive.  
To sum up the findings of this section, we can conclude that the EU is somewhat poorly supplied 
with its own energy resources. Having estimated the dynamic trends of the EU total energy production 
and inland consumption, we have identified a large gap between them, which emphasizes the necessity 
of importing energy sources. The dependence of the EU supply of energy sources on Russian imports 
and the threats this issue brings to the EU energy security have been outlined. The dynamic trend of the 
import pattern demonstrates that after 2008 the European countries decreased their consumption of 
Russian energy sources presumably due to economic crisis and some political issues that involved 
Russia, so that nowadays the imports is more or less at the same level.  
I continue further in investigation the internal EU market of renewable sources and conclude that 
almost all member countries are increasing both the production and the consumption of renewables 
aiming at reaching the EU 2020 objective. 
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2.2.  POSSIBILITIES OF ALTERNATIVE AND RENEWABLE ENERGY AT THE MODERN 
STAGE 
 
It is first important to highlight that renewable energy sources are not exactly the same as 
alternative energy sources. Alternative energy is a broader category encompassing all non-fossil-fuel-
based energy sources and processes, of which renewable energies are only a part (Globalization101, 
2015). 
Motivation of investigating the issue of possibilities of alternative energy in the EU is driven to a 
great extent by the fact that Europe is heavily dependent on imported oil for its mobility and transport, 
which dampens its energy security but can be avoided with the help of alternative energy sources. 
Thus, according to the data provided by the European Commission as of 2013, in 2010, oil counted for 
94% of energy consumed in transport, with 55% the largest consumer, 84% of it imported, with a bill 
of up to €1 billion a day in 2011, leading to a significant deficit in the EU trade balance of around 2.5% 
of GDP (EC, 2013a).  
Moreover, the EU supply of oil, and thus the mobility of its citizens, depends to a large degree on 
politically unstable regions raising security of supply concerns. Price hikes driven by speculation on the 
impact of oil supply disruptions have cost the European economy an additional € 50 billion per year 
over the last four years. The effect of the oil dependency on the European economy is too large to 
neglect, which creates a necessity of recruiting alternative energy sources into the supply process. A 
strategy for the transport sector to gradually replace oil with alternative fuels and build up the necessary 
infrastructure could bring savings on the oil import bill as well as ensure the energy supply stability and 
lower dependence on external providers.  
The European Commission Communication on a European alternative fuels strategy evaluates the 
main alternative fuel options available to substitute oil whilst contributing to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions from transport, and suggests a comprehensive list of measures to promote the market 
development of alternative fuels in Europe, complementing other policies for reducing oil consumption 
and GHG emissions from transport. According to the Commission, the main alternative fuel options are 
electricity, hydrogen, biofuels, natural gas (in the forms of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG), or Gas-To-Liquid (GTL)), and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) (EC, 2013a).  
At present, the market development of alternative fuels is still held back by technological and 
commercial short-comings, lack of consumer acceptance and missing adequate infrastructure. The 
current high cost of innovative alternative fuel applications is largely a consequence of these 
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shortcomings. Initiatives to support alternative transport fuels exist at both EU and national level but a 
coherent and stable overarching strategy with an investment friendly regulatory framework needs to be 
put in place. 
Let‘s now turn to an overview of the possibilities of alternative energy at the current stage and 
analyze the main types of alternative sources as recognized by the EU Commission. 
LPG is a by-product of the hydrocarbon fuel chain and its use in transport increases resource 
efficiency. Currently, it derives from crude oil and natural gas and in the future possibly also from 
biomass. LPG is widely used in Europe, accounting for 3% of motor fuels and powering 9 million cars. 
LPG infrastructure is well established, with some 28,000 dispensing sites in the EU but with a very 
uneven distribution across the Member States. Its advantage consisting in producing low pollutant 
emissions, however, has been diminishing as the EURO standards have progressed to lower general 
emission limits. There remains, however, a clear advantage in particulate emissions. LPG might still 
expand its market share but will likely remain a niche market (EC, 2013a). 
The next source to be considered is natural gas, which offers a long-term perspective in terms of 
security of supply to transport and a large potential to contribute to the diversification of transport 
fuels. It also offers significant environmental benefits, in particular when it is blended with biomethane 
and provided that fugitive emissions are minimized. Natural gas also presents an advantage in lower 
emissions.  
Another type of natural gas is this gas in liquefied form (LNG), which with high energy density 
offers a cost-efficient alternative to diesel for waterborne activities (transport, offshore services, and 
fisheries), trucks and rail, with lower pollutant and CO2 emissions and higher energy efficiency. LNG 
is particularly suited for long-distance road freight transport for which alternatives to diesel are 
extremely limited.  
LNG is also an attractive fuel option for vessels in particular to meet the new limits for sulphur 
content in marine fuels decreasing from 1% to 0.1% from 1 January 2015 in Sulphur Emission Control 
Areas (SECAs) in the Baltic Sea, North Sea and English Channel as set by the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO). These obligations will be relevant for about half of the 10,000 ships currently 
engaged in intra-EU shipping. LNG is an attractive economic alternative also for shipping outside 
SECAs, where sulphur limits will decrease from 3.5% to 0.5% from 1 January 2020, and globally (EC, 
2013a). 
According to the final report of North European LNG infrastructure project as of May 2012, the 
lack of fuelling infrastructure and common technical specifications on refueling equipment and safety 
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regulations for bunkering hamper market uptake. LNG in shipping, on the other hand, could be 
economically viable, with current EU prices considerably lower than for heavy fuel oil and low sulphur 
marine gasoil, and prospects of increasing spreads in future (Danish Maritime Authority, 2012). 
Moreover, LNG development into a global commodity can improve security of energy supply in 
general by boosting the use of natural gas as fuel for transport.  
Next type of the alternative source to be analyzed is compressed natural gas (CNG). CNG 
vehicles have low pollutant emissions and have therefore rapidly gained ground in urban fleets of 
buses, utility trucks and taxis. Optimized gas-only vehicles can have higher energy efficiency. An 
economically viable market development could be expected by private initiatives as CNG vehicles are 
competitive with conventional vehicles in price and performance, and natural gas is cheaper than petrol 
and diesel. But public intervention is necessary to avoid fragmented EU level markets and to enable 
EU-wide mobility for CNG vehicles. 
Natural gas can also be transformed to a liquid fuel by first decomposing it to a "synthesis gas", 
consisting of hydrogen and carbon monoxide, and then by refining to a synthetic fuel with the same 
technical characteristics as conventional fuels, fully compatible with existing combustion engines and 
fuel infrastructure. Synthetic fuels can also be produced from waste feedstock. They improve the 
security of supply and reduce pollutant emissions of present vehicles. Moreover they promote advanced 
engine technologies of higher energy efficiency. High cost, however, presently limits market take-up 
(EC, 2013a). 
Next alternative source under consideration is bioenergy. According to the European Biomass 
Association (AEBIOM) report as of 2014, final energy consumption of bioenergy in 2012 was 102 
Mtoe, almost double that of 2000. Biomass for heat and bioheat represent 74,7 Mtoe followed by 
biofuels for transport at 14,6 Mtoe and biopower at 12,8 Mtoe (AEBIOM, 2014).  
Biofuels are currently the most important type of alternative fuels, accounting for 4.4% in EU 
transport. They can contribute to a substantial reduction in overall CO2 emissions, if they are produced 
sustainably and do not cause indirect land use change. They could provide clean power to all modes of 
transport. However, supply constraints and sustainability considerations may limit their use. Biofuels 
can be produced from a wide range of feedstock through technologies in constant evolution and used 
directly or blended with conventional fossil fuels. They include bioethanol, biomethanol and higher 
bioalcohols, biodiesel (fatty-acid methyl ester, FAME), pure vegetable oils, hydrotreated vegetable oils, 
dimethyl ether (DME), and organic compounds. 
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In addition to this, biofuels can serve as a renewable alternative to jet fuel in airliners but are 
currently not produced on a large commercial scale for this purpose. To help spur the commercial 
development of biofuels for aviation, the European Commission and its partners have launched 
the European Advanced Biofuels Flightpath (EC, 2015b). 
Turning now to the legislative side of the issue, it should be noted that the EU adopted the 
Renewable Energy Directive and a revision of Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) in 2009 as part of the 
Climate and Energy Package. The Renewable Energy Directive introduced a mandatory target of 10% 
renewable energy in the EU transport sector. The 10% can be met through renewable electricity, 
hydrogen and sustainable biofuels. 
However, due to the limited progress achieved under the non-binding 2003 Biofuels Directive, 
the objectives of renewables incorporation in transport were made mandatory. The RED determines 
that by 2020 Member States must meet at least 10% of the national energy demand in road transport 
through renewable energy sources, including biofuels (ePURE, 2015). 
The second mentioned document, namely the revised Fuel Quality Directive (FQD), introduced 
an objective to decrease GHG emissions by all liquid fuels used in the transport sector by 6%, an 
objective that is expected to be met with similar amount of renewable energy required under the RED. 
The FQD defines the permitted level of emissions derived from fossil fuels and includes an obligatory 
target of 6% of GHG emission reductions in fuels, to be achieved by member states by 2020 (ePURE, 
2015). 
To qualify for both the RED and FQD targets, biofuels consumed in the European Union must 
comply and demonstrate compliance with strict sustainability criteria. They set rigorous requirements 
on the minimum level of greenhouse gas emissions savings, appropriate land use as well as monitoring 
requirements for any potential adverse effect. In particular: 
 Emission savings: biofuels must provide at least 35% GHG emissions savings compared to 
fossil fuels, a threshold set to rise to 50% as of 2017, and to 60% as of 2018 for new 
installations; 
 Land use: raw material must not be grown on land with high-carbon stocks (e.g. forests), of 
high biodiversity value (highly biodiverse grasslands), or wetlands. 
 Biofuels produced within the EU must meet cross compliance environmental rules, part of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. 
These sustainability criteria make the EU biofuel sector a front-runner in the field of sustainable 
production. However, their application to biofuels alone sets the industry at a competitive disadvantage 
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and hampers its ability to develop new technologies. If the EU is serious about curbing climate change 
then these criteria should be expanded to all products, from fossil energy to food production 
and biomass for electricity (ePURE, 2015). 
Moreover, in January 2014, the European Commission set out its vision for EU climate and 
energy policy up to 2030. Based on this Communication, the policies that have driven biofuel uptake 
and attempted to mitigate their consequences would be altered dramatically post 2020. One of the 
important statements of this document is that biofuels produced from food-based feedstocks should not 
receive ‗public support‘ after 2020 since these biofuels do not lead to substantial greenhouse gas 
savings (IEEP, 2014).   
According to the EEA report as of June 2013, the general target of 20% renewable energy for 
2020 translates into individual targets for Member States, which range from 10% (for Malta) to 49% 
(for Sweden). In 2010 Member States adopted National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs), 
which indicate how much each bioenergy source will contribute to achieving their renewable energy 
targets. From these NREAPs it is apparent that bioenergy will make up more than half of all renewable 
energy in 2020 — implying that it will account for about 10% of the EU's total gross final energy 
consumption. Some Member States that have limited alternative renewable-energy options and large 
biomass resources significantly exceed the average EU share of biomass within their final energy 
consumption (EEA, 2013). 
However, it should be noted that such optimistic scenarios may be unrealistic, because of a 
number of uncertainties that include in particular the following: the continuation of financial support to 
the development of biogas; the sustainability of biomass production with its impacts on ecosystems; the 
effect of competition on cultivated land between biomass production and food and feed production; and 
the issue of deforestation. Nevertheless, in the period up to 2030 – and certainly up to 2020 – biogas is 
likely to make a much greater contribution to European natural gas balances than unconventional gas. 
Looking beyond 2020, the EU's Energy Roadmap 2050 likewise foresees a central role for 
bioenergy in delivering an 80–95% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Such ambitious 
reduction targets underline the importance of developing bioenergy in a way that enables very 
substantial cuts in GHG emissions and does not impact on ecological resources (EEA, 2013).  
With the aforementioned targets in mind, it is evident that a range of bioenergy technologies need 
to be deployed over the coming years in order to meet those targets. Experts believe that biomass is 
likely to contribute half the 20% renewable energy target (EREC, 2014).  
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Turning now to the second issue under study within this section, namely the possibilities of 
renewable energy sources at a current stage, it is important to start with the fact that the promotion of 
renewable energy is a cornerstone in the EU's climate and energy strategy until 2020 as illustrated by 
the 20/20/20 targets for greenhouse gas reductions, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources 
contained in the Europe 2020 Strategy for growth and jobs (EC, 2010a). 
In 2010, the renewables share in the EU was 12.7% in comparison with 8.5% in 2005. Following 
the introduction of indicative targets (2001-2010), the share of renewable energy grew annually by 
4.5%. With legally binding national targets growth has increased but needs to average 6.3% per year to 
meet the overall 2020 target. The share of renewables in transport reached 4.7% in 2010 compared to 
only 1.2% in 2005. In the heating and cooling sector, renewable energy continues to grow and its share 
should nearly double by 2020. However, new measures will be needed for most Member States to 
achieve their 2020 targets reflecting the scaling back of support schemes and more difficult access to 
finance in the context of the economic crisis (EC, 2013b). 
It is now worthwhile to examine the possibilities of renewable energy within the EU at a modern 
stage by considering major sources of this kind of energy separately, taking into account their current 
status and outlook for their future development. 
Let‘s first start with the small hydropower, defined by installed capacity of up to 10 MW. 
According to the European Renewable Energy Council and European Small Hydropower Association, 
small hydropower is the backbone of electricity production in many countries in the European 
Union.  Hydropower technology is already highly efficient and affordable (in terms of investment cost 
and internal rate of return). Furthermore the technology has a long life span. 
In general, most of Europe‘s hydropower storage capacity is concentrated in Scandinavia, the 
Alps and the Pyrenees. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which is the 
leading international body for the assessment of climate change, the undeveloped hydropower potential 
in Europe is 47 % of the technically feasible potential (IPCC, 2015).  
The EURELECTRIC report as of 2013 provides the following key figures on hydropower in 
Europe (EURELECTRIC, 2013b):  
Table 1.Hydropower in EU-27 
 EU-27 
Generation 338 TWh 
Capacity 136 GW 
Further generation potential 276 TWh 
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It is also important to mention that hydropower shows the highest energy payback ratio in 
comparison with all other technologies – renewables as well as conventional ones. During its lifetime a 
hydropower plant produces more than 200 times the energy needed to build, maintain and operate it. 
Reasons for the high-energy payback ratio are the very long lifetime of hydropower schemes and the 
short energy conversion process. Once built, hydropower infrastructure can generate electricity for 
many decades, often even for more than 100 years. For this reason, lifecycle assessments for 
hydropower generally provide a very good carbon footprint and energy efficiency profile 
(EURELECTRIC, 2013a).  
However, on the way of hydropower further deployment in Europe there are several challenges 
concerning competitiveness. Capital costs are high, and payback starts late due to long permit granting 
procedures and construction times. Such a long permit granting procedure increases the uncertainty 
about the future regulatory framework, and represents a high risk at the time of the investment decision. 
Moreover, administrative barriers and regulatory changes during operation represent additional 
challenges. Grid fees can disadvantage pumped storage plants compared with other competing 
flexibility options. Therefore, some policy changes are still to be taken by the EU in order to fully 
utilize the advantages of hydropower, which would in its turn help to maintain high energy security 
level (EURELECTRIC, 2013a).  
The next source of renewable energy to be analyzed under the framework of the issue stated in 
the topic of the section is photovoltaic energy. Among various renewable energy technologies today, 
photovoltaics (PV) attracts considerable attention due to its potential to contribute a major share of 
renewable energy in the future. Let us consider some recent figures. According to International Energy 
Agency, in Europe PV systems for a total rated power equal to17.27 GW were installed in 2012, below 
the 22.13 GW of 2011, bringing the PV cumulative capacity to 69.6 GW (IEA, 2015). German remains 
at the forefront, with 7.604 GW of installed PV power in 2012, followed by Italy (3.647 GW), France 
(1.079 GW), the U.K. (0.925 GW) and Greece (0.912 GW). Spain, despite impressive growth in recent 
years (especially 2008), is at the 3rd place in Europe for cumulative PV capacity (4.706 GW) behind 
Germany (32.461 GW) and Italy (16.450 GW), but its additional PV power was very low in 2012 (223 
MW) (IEA, 2015).  
The PV contribution to the electricity demand has surpassed 1% in several countries. Italy is in 
the first place, with a percentage close to 7%, which corresponds to a higher percentage of 14% 
referred to as peak electricity demand. Germany is in the second place, with 5.6%, followed by Greece 
(3.5%). In Germany, in particular, the 32.461 GW of cumulated PV capacity produces, on certain days, 
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up to 45% of the instantaneous power demand and around 14% of the electricity during peak periods 
(EPIA, 2014).  
The development of the PV sector in the last decade has been fuelled by the implementation of 
various supporting strategies, aimed at reducing the gap between the PV energy cost and the cost of 
energy for conventional generation. The deployment of support policies has spurred the reduction of 
PV energy costs, making possible, as early as 2012 and 2013, ―fuel parity‖ in some countries. Despite 
this, PV is still not very competitive and its development requires adequate support mechanisms and 
simple grid connection procedures. In Europe PV is to a great extent supported mainly by feed-in 
tariffs and net-metering. The most successful examples of feed-in tariff systems in the EU can be found 
in Germany and Italy (IEA, 2010). 
Now, let‘s take an outlook for the development of this type of alternative energy source in the EU 
framework. For 2030 to 2050, European Photovoltaic Industry Association together with European 
Renewable Energy Council have shown the high potential of PV within the RE-thinking 2050 scenario 
(EREC, 2010). 
 Based on the intermediate ―SET For 2020‖ scenario, PV could reach as much a 962 GW of 
installed capacity by 2050 in Europe. The potential of photovoltaic electricity could, however, be at 
least 50 % higher in Europe by 2050. Available land area and buildings in ―zero impact areas‖ (i.e. 
areas not in competition with food production, natural reserves, housing, industry or other purposes) 
represents a potential of more than 5,000 TWh of yearly PV electricity production (EREC, 2015).  
According to the European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA) global market outlook for 
photovoltaics 2014-2018, overall the future of the European market is uncertain for the coming years. 
The drastic decrease of some feed-in tariffs programs may push some markets down, with a limited 
number of emerging markets in Europe that could offset any major decline. Given these new 
conditions, the short-term prospects for the European markets are stable in the best case, and could 
even decline.  
According to European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA), it can reasonably be assumed 
that photovoltaic electricity will become a mainstream power source in Europe by 2020 and a major 
power source in 2050. The ―SET for 2020‖ study carried out by EPIA outlines that, provided some 
boundary conditions are met, PV could supply up to 12% of the electricity demand in Europe by 2020, 
thus representing 390 GW of installed capacity and 460 TWh of electricity generation (EPIA, 2009). 
Next source of alternative energy to be mentioned within the framework of possibilities of 
alternative energy at a current stage in the EU is geothermal energy. 
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According to the European Renewable Energy Council, the largest geothermal district heating 
systems within Europe can be found in the Paris area in France, with Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland, Slovakia and others showing a substantial number of interesting geothermal district heating 
systems. Sweden, Switzerland, Germany and Austria are the leading countries in terms of market for 
geothermal heat pumps in Europe. Moreover, there are approximately 1000 MW of electric power 
(with conventional technology) installed in the EU, around the clock.  However, the relevant resources 
are far from being fully developed, also in Europe. (EREC, 2015). 
Let‘s now turn to analyzing ocean energy current potential for the EU. The ocean is an enormous 
source of renewable energy with the potential to satisfy an important percentage of the European 
electricity supply. Conversion of the wave energy resource alone could supply a substantial part of the 
electricity demand of several European countries, in particular Ireland, the UK, Denmark, Portugal, 
Spain and Norway, especially on islands and in remote areas. The best ocean energy resources within 
the EU Member States are wave energy and marine currents, which have seen the most technological 
development. Salinity gradient systems are being developed in Norway and the Netherlands. Ocean 
thermal energy conversion technologies are not yet available in Europe but can be harvested at latitudes 
closer to the Equator with technologies developed by European companies. 
According to the European Renewable Energy Council, over the past few years, dedicated 
infrastructure for wave and tidal sea trials have been created in several European countries. They 
facilitate deployment of technologies from prototype to commercial phase by making cable connection 
available and/or simplifying the licensing procedure. At present, several grid connected test areas are 
under development, scheduled to be operational with the coming 1 to 3 years. 
Nowadays, tidal barrage is the only ocean energy technology that has been operating for decades. 
La Rance, France was inaugurated in 1966 and has been exploited commercially ever since. Several 
wave and marine current technologies are currently in (full scale) demonstration stage. Salinity gradient 
and OTEC are still largely in R&D stage. However, the first salinity gradient prototype installation is 
operational since December 2009 in Statkraft, Norway. The installed capacity in 2009 was 
approximately 250 MW. This included La Rance in France that has an annual production of 550 GWh  
(EREC, 2015). 
Although ocean energy R&D started decades ago, remarkable development has only taken place 
since the beginning of this century. Overall, ocean energy development is no longer limited to 
academic research. Recently, large companies, utilities and industrial consortia have started to invest 
substantially in ocean energy projects demonstrating the ambition of the sector. Political engagement is 
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being demonstrated by Member States with high ocean energy resources by means of dedicated 
research funding programs, support schemes and ambitious national targets (EREC, 2015). 
It is also important to consider the outlook for this kind of energy for the distant future. Thus, 
according to the latest data provided by EREC, in terms of electricity production generated by the 
sector, ocean energy estimates are the following: 8.94 TWh in 2020, 150 TWh in 2030, 549 TWh in 
2040 and 645 TWh in 2050. These assumptions are based on the development of offshore wind and 
assume saturation in 2050. In terms of cost, it has to be noted that the cost of ocean energy is very 
technology specific. Cost figures are still being developed as devices enter long-term energy production 
stage. The 2011 Carbon Trust report ‗Accelerating Marine Energy‘ estimates the cost for wave energy. 
According to it, the current baseline costs of energy from marine devices are higher than conventional 
fossil fuel generation and more developed renewable energy technologies such as onshore and offshore 
wind. There is therefore a clear need to explore the potential for cost reduction, and to understand how 
this can be accelerated to make wave and tidal a cost-effective option for low carbon energy generation 
(The Carbon Trust, 2011). 
Following the European Renewable Energy Council‘s forecast, growth of the sector to 2020 is 
estimated by using an exponential curve that follows the growth since 1998 leading to projected 
installed capacity of 3,6 GW by 2020. Considering ocean energy faces similar challenges as the 
offshore wind sector, a similar growth curve has been used to project the 2030 and 2050 scenarios 
leading to a projected installed capacity of 54 GW by 2030 and 188 GW by 2050. Furthermore, it is 
considered highly likely that ocean energy will form synergies with offshore wind (EREC, 2015). 
It should be mentioned within the framework of this issue that one of the main hindering factors 
for ocean energy expansion will be the availability and capacity of the offshore and coastal electrical 
grid. Unlike the offshore wind sector, which has been involved in the planning process for the grid 
expansion and development for many years, the ocean energy sector has difficulties to push in favor of 
its inclusion in grid development planning. Policy makers at both national and EU level have to ensure 
that all options for future offshore energy sources are taken into account.  
According to European Ocean Energy Association (EU-OEA), there are several projects 
currently going on with respect to the ocean energy development. It is worthwhile to briefly mention 
those projects and their current status in order to see how much attention is dedicated to the 
development of this sector. 
DTOcean is a European collaborative project funded by the European Commission under the 7th 
Framework Programme for Research and Development. The project aims at accelerating the industrial 
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development of ocean energy power generation knowledge, and providing design tools for deploying 
the first generation of wave and tidal energy converter arrays. It gathers 18 partners from 11 countries 
(Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal, France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium 
and United States of America) under the coordination of the University of Edinburgh (EU-OEA, 2015). 
The second important project is the Strategic Initiative for Ocean Energy (acronym SI Ocean), 
officially started on 23 June 2012. The project is coordinated by Ocean Energy Europe in close 
cooperation with 6 partners: the European Commission's Join Research Centre, the UK Carbon Trust, 
Portugal's Wave Energy Centre, Edinburgh University, Renewable UK and DHI. The key objectives of 
the project are resource assessment and identification of European hot spots for Ocean Energy as well 
as outlining key priorities for technology development and combining resource and technical 
assessment with a comprehensive policy and market analysis of the Atlantic arc countries (EU-OEA, 
2015). 
As we can see, the ocean energy is paid a lot of attention by the EU nowadays, which makes it 
one of the potential sources of alternative energy to outline future EU prospects with respect to energy 
security. 
Last but not least wind energy should be analyzed. According to the European Commission, wind 
energy is one of the fastest growing energy sources. Since 2000, around one third of all installed 
electricity generating capacity in the EU has been wind power. The share of wind power in total 
electricity production in Europe was 3.7% in 2007, but with huge differences among the Member 
States: Germany and Spain together account for more than half of the total installed capacity in Europe. 
In Denmark, wind energy contributes more than 20% of the total electricity production of the country 
(EC, 2015a). 
The wind power industry has the ambition to continue the fast growth of recent years. The 
sector's objective is to provide 20% of final EU electricity consumption by 2020. This can only be 
achieved if wind turbines can move offshore in order to profit from the more favorable wind conditions 
on the sea. This however requires considerable research efforts targeting in particular costs reduction of 
wind turbines, improved reliability and grid integration (EC, 2015a). 
Following the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) 2015 report, the most recent trends 
in this sector development included the following:  
 11,791.4 MW of wind power capacity (worth between €13.1bn and €18.7bn) was installed in 
the EU during 2014, an increase of 3.8% compared to 2013 annual installations. 
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 Wind power is the generating technology with the highest rate for new installations in 2014, 
accounting for 43.7% of total 2014 power capacity installations, 12 percentage points higher 
than during the previous year. 
 There is now 128.8 GW of installed wind power capacity in the EU: approximately 120.6 GW 
onshore and just over 8 GW offshore. 
 Annual installations of wind power have increased over the last 14 years, from 3.2 GW in 2000, 
to 11.8 GW in 2014 at a compound annual growth rate of 9.8% (EWEA, 2015). 
Germany remains the EU country with the largest installed capacity followed by Spain, the UK 
and France. There are 15 EU countries with gigawatt-level wind power capacities installed, including 
two relatively new EU countries (Poland and Romania), and eight EU countries each have more than 4 
GW of installed capacity (EWEA, 2015). In appendix A the data as of 2015 by the EWEA is provided 
and it shows how wind energy is currently incorporated into the EU energy consumption system 
It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent report 21/2014 by the European Environment Agency 
and a consortium led by CE Delft, which investigates energy support measures and their impact on 
innovation in the renewable energy sector in Europe. Having considered a variety of perspectives on 
the renewables, the report concludes that despite growing interest in promoting renewable energy, in 
2012 many support measures in Europe targeting fossil fuels and nuclear sectors were still in place, and 
continued to affect public budgets, constituting a burden on public budgets, because they are revenue 
forgone by governments. Meanwhile, the renewable support is a mix of surcharges on the energy bill of 
the end users, and governmental support. In the case of electricity, the former type of support prevails. 
Consequently, such support does not represent a burden on public budgets, but it does affect energy 
prices for end users, particularly when the merit order effect is not passed on to them. The report states 
that support for fossil fuels affects market conditions for renewable energy, but there is little evidence 
that the impact is significant, given the support allocated to the renewable sector (EEA, 2014). 
According to the research mentioned above, countries' strategies differ when it comes to 
supporting fossil fuels, so the renewable sector must compete with a unique price structure for these 
fuels in each country. Therefore a more harmonized framework for energy taxation would be a good 
start for facilitating further developments in the renewable sector. 
It is emphasized that there are several factors that are crucial for the innovation process in the 
renewable sector, namely: political will (or the lack thereof) to shift the focus onto the renewable 
sector, pre-existing innovation capabilities, the level of investment in research and development (R&D) 
for renewable technologies and renewable policy design. This has been observed in developments in 
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Denmark as well as in the four target countries, namely: the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Spain 
and Switzerland (EEA, 2014).  
To summarize the findings of this section it is worth mentioning that at the current stage of the 
EU existence, the EU is paying great attention to the alternative and renewable sources of energy. The 
analysis of the relevant trends showed that the EU is working hard towards increasing each of the 
alternative energy sources share in the transport sector and the share of renewables in total energy 
production.  
The analysis showed that market development of alternative fuels should break the dependence 
on oil and contribute to improving the security of Europe's energy supply, support economic growth, 
strengthen the competitiveness of European industry, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
transport. Biogas has been considered as a direct substitute for natural gas which can be used in many 
of the same applications: heat, steam, electricity generation and co-generation, the vehicle fuel market, 
feedstock in the chemical industry (fertilizer), and grid injection.  
Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that biogas can be considered as indigenous production 
and can be viewed as improving security of supply. However, even despite the optimistic scenarios and 
fast development of the alternative sources, it should be noted that these optimistic scenarios may be 
unrealistic, because of a number of uncertainties that include in particular the following: the 
continuation of financial support to the development of biogas; the sustainability of biomass production 
with its impacts on ecosystems; the effect of competition on cultivated land between biomass 
production and food and feed production; and the issue of deforestation. Nevertheless, the importance 
of alternative sources has been established clearly. 
This section additionally framed the perspectives for each of the analyzed alternative and 
renewable energy sources with respect to the EU target for 2020, 2030 and 2050. Based on the outlook 
provided by specialized organizations and analysis of current trends, it can be concluded that the EU 
seems to be able to meet the set objectives by the year of 2020 as well as move towards the more 




3. POTENTIAL OF EU ENERGY POLICY TO TACKLE ENERGY SECURITY PROBLEMS 
3.1 EVOLUTION OF ENERGY POLICY 
From the very beginning, the EU energy policy has been about joining forces to 
achieve particular purposes and these particular purposes have evolved over time. In order to truly 
appreciate European integration development, it is crucial to understand the role energy has played and 
has still the potential for throughout more than 50 years history of this process.  
Indeed, it is hardly possible to explain the origins of the European Union without considering 
what happened in Europe just after the end of World War II. Starting with the establishment of the 
European Coal Organization in 1946 and then the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 
1948, energy was a cornerstone of European integration.  
The rationale for establishing the first Community organization in 1951, the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), lay explicitly with the energy-related challenges that Europe had to face 
during those years. A similar motivation lay behind the creation of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EUROATOM) in 1957, with both the latter and the ECSC constituting the basic pillars of 
the European Economic Community (Morata and Sandoval, 2012). 
Thus, it is accurate to argue that energy is not only deeply rooted in European construction, but 
that it has been in itself – with more or less success – a driver of integration. The early development of 
the EU energy policy is described in some more details below. 
In 1951, in the aftermath of the World War II, the European Coal and Steel Community was 
created in order to pool the production of coal and steel in the Member States (France, West Germany, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy), ensuring that these commodities, essential for industrial 
development, would be available to all. The purpose was strongly political as well as economic. The 
pooling of production would make war between the members as stated in the Schuman Declaration 
―not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible‖ (Fontaine, 2000). 
Later in the 1950‘s, in a context of rising energy demand in Europe, depletion of easily accessible 
coal and concern about growing dependence on oil imports (1956 Suez Crisis), nuclear energy seemed 
promising as a new element in the energy supply mix. This was a time of Cold War and nuclear 
weapons research so nuclear energy development needed to be kept clearly separate from weapons 
development. In 1957, Member States created the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 
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a supranational control system for fissile materials, also safety standards and a framework for 
cooperation on the development of nuclear energy (IIEA, 2015).  
Despite the fact that two of the founding treaties of the European Communities were concerned 
with energy, EU activity in energy policy is a relative novelty and essentially only relatively recently 
started with the paradigmatic shift of energy regulation in Europe and the start of the liberalization 
process in the 1990s (Renner, 2009).  
The next period in the evolution of the EU energy policy can be named as first serious challenges 
to overcome. When oil crises loomed in the late 1960‘s, the provisions in the European Community for 
dealing with supply difficulties in general were brought into play. All Member States committed to 
building up oil stocks and using them in a coordinated way in crises. Over the next years, Member 
States went on to agree common energy policy objectives, still much influenced by energy security 
concerns - rational use of energy, development of domestic resources, diversification of supplies (IIEA, 
2015).  
The 1973 oil-crisis revealed the weaknesses of Europe‘s energy policies, which increased 
cooperation somewhat by the formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA). However, it was not 
until the 1986 Single European Act that the economic importance of energy was acknowledged within 
the European integration process. Decision-makers realized that a freer European energy market was 
necessary for a functioning Single Market. The first real breakthrough in integrating national energy 
policies was established by the Maastricht Treaty, where the EU set out on a course of liberalization of 
the European electricity and gas markets. Yet, at the turn of the century the liberalization process had 
slowed down significantly because of changes in the international energy market (Eriksson, 2011).  
In the 1980‘s, energy was brought into the renewed push to establish a single European 
market. Competition in the provision of services which had traditionally been offered as public utilities 
was expected to yield benefits to consumers.  Concerns about fossil fuel supplies had diminished by 
this time, global prices were dropping, North Sea oil and gas was coming on stream and in electricity 
generation, Combined Cycle Gas Turbine technology was providing a competitive new option. 
Liberalization and competition in Europe should bring new market players, innovation and lower prices 
for consumers. With enough interconnections, a single energy market should also 
strengthen cohesion and security of supply. Legislation to create a single energy market has been 
adopted gradually from 1996 (Eriksson, 2011). 
Several opinions of various researchers in the field of energy economics on the development of 
energy policy within the European area are worth being mentioned here. Thus, according to Buchan, 
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the development of a European energy policy can instead be viewed as an organic process, a slow 
progress often running ahead of treaty clauses (Buchan, 2009). McGowan argues that along the early 
development of the European energy policy, policymakers mainly used legal competences from the 
economic and environmental parts of the treaties in order to push for common energy initiatives 
(McGowan, 1996). Andersen, for instance, means that the Commission‘s ability to introduce energy 
initiatives ―from the side‖, made it the main driver for a common energy policy (Andersen, 2001). 
The 1990‘s had offered favorable conditions for member states to support the Commission‘s 
market-oriented approach, through low energy prices, plentiful of European oil and gas reserves and 
healthy competition between several energy exporting countries, and gave confidence to the market‘s 
ability to ensure reasonable energy prices and security of supply (Eriksson, 2011).  
During this time, new objectives for EU energy policy were agreed. In 1990, Europe made a clear 
political commitment to the global climate challenge and followed up with targets and strategies for 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction. The need for a transition to an efficient, low-carbon energy 
system became quickly clear, the issue was how best to achieve it. Energy efficiency gains and fuel 
switching were essential. Community instruments such as standards, R&D and others, were brought 
into service. However, there was not enough political support for a 1991 CO2/energy tax (Eriksson, 
2011).  
Generally speaking, until 1997 most European Member States kept monopolistic structures in 
energy supply and distribution at least for their domestic energy carriers. In Eastern European 
countries, until 1989 the dominating principle was central planning in economy, which for energy 
supply meant increasing the absolute amount of energy generated, immaterial of the related cost. 
Transparency on real cost of supply was in most cases not given, as both final energy prices, cost of 
labor, and mostly also investment cost were subject to political steering. When looking at the role 
which certain energy carriers played in the historical setup in many European countries, it becomes 
evident that mainly hard coal and from the 1960s onwards also nuclear stood in the focus of policy 
induced strategies still ranking strategic security of supply higher than least cost options (EC, 2014c). 
After the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the Emissions Trading System was created in 2005 as a means of 
putting a price on carbon emissions. In 2007, 2020 targets were agreed for greenhouse gas emissions, 
renewables and energy efficiency (EC, 2012).   
When investigating the recent development more thoroughly, it can be seen that during the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century the situation of the European energy markets has changed dramatically.  
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First, European oil and gas reserves were quickly depleting, while investment in energy 
infrastructure decreased and energy consumption grew, making EU increasingly dependent on energy 
imports (Umbach, 2010). As a result, energy has increasingly been identified as a security issue within 
the EU. High and volatile oil prices and growing energy demand coupled with increasingly unreliable 
supply of energy made Europe consider energy supply and sustainability in terms of security. The 
partial success of pushing towards more liberalized European energy markets and the optimism of a 
common energy policy were soon replaced by a time of vulnerability and instability in the European 
energy markets (Eriksson, 2011). 
Secondly, the post-9/11 effects and the increasingly troublesome political situation in many 
supply countries increased the instability of the international energy market. Simultaneously new 
dominant economies such as China and India emerged and increased the global demand of energy 
supplies significantly. The international energy market experienced a structural shift from a ―buyers‟ 
market‖, where suppliers compete for buyers, to a ―sellers‟ market‖, where buyers compete for 
suppliers. The new situation on the international energy market made energy prices grow and the EU‘s 
dependence on third countries for energy supplies increased (Eriksson, 2011). 
Simultaneously, climate change became one of the most urgent issues on the political agenda, 
making sustainability of energy production a growing security issue for Europe. Energy and 
environmental policies are inextricably linked, since all energy production and consumption has 
environmental impacts. Considering the fact that energy is one of the most polluting sectors of the 
European economy, the need for an integrated energy and climate policy became increasingly urgent. 
Therefore, let‘s now turn to a brief overview of the EU environmental policy within the framework of 
the energy policy of the Union.  
In many regards energy and environmental objectives go hand in hand. First to be mentioned is 
energy efficiency and reducing energy use issues. Saving energy can help avoid impacts associated 
with extractive industries and with energy generation, transformation, distribution and consumption in 
general. It can also help reducing GHG emissions, air pollution, impacts to surface and ground waters, 
habitat fragmentation and biodiversity disturbance through infrastructure and land use, etc. The EU has 
put forward several measures to improve efficiency at all stages of the energy chain and it is aiming for 
a 20% cut in Europe's annual primary energy consumption by 2020. Moreover, at an EU summit in 
October 2014, the EU countries agreed on a new energy efficiency target of 27% or greater by 2030. 
What is more, the European Commission had proposed 30% in its Energy Efficiency Communication 
(EC, 2014d).  
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Over the past decades the European Union has put in place a broad range of environmental 
legislation. As a result, air, water and soil pollution has significantly been reduced. Chemicals 
legislation has been modernized and the use of many toxic or hazardous substances has been restricted. 
Today, EU citizens enjoy some of the best water quality in the world and over 18% of EU's territory 
has been designated as protected areas for nature. However, many challenges persist and these must be 
tackled together in a structured way (EC, 2014e). 
The 7th Environment Action Programme (EAP) will be guiding European environment policy 
until 2020. In order to give more long-term direction it sets out a vision beyond that, of where it wants 
the Union to be by 2050. The programme identifies three priority areas where more action is needed to 
protect nature and strengthen ecological resilience, boost resource-efficient, low-carbon growth, and 
reduce threats to human health and wellbeing linked to pollution, chemical substances, and the impacts 
of climate change (EC, 2014e). 
The first action area is linked to ―natural capital‖ – from fertile soil and productive land and seas 
to fresh water and clean air – as well as the biodiversity that supports it. Natural capital includes vital 
services such as pollination of plants, natural protection against flooding, and the regulation of our 
climate. The Union has made commitments to halt biodiversity loss and achieve good status for 
Europe‘s waters and marine environment. Moreover, it has put in place the means to achieve this, with 
legally-binding commitments including the Water Framework Directive, the Air Quality Directive, and 
the Habitats and Birds Directives, together with financial and technical support.  
The second action area concerns the conditions that will help transform the EU into a resource-
efficient, low-carbon economy and is closely linked to 2020 targets set by the EU. The third key action 
area covers challenges to human health and wellbeing, such as air and water pollution, excessive noise, 
and toxic chemicals (EC, 2014e). 
It is noteworthy to consider several particular environmentally related policies of the EU. First is 
EU excise duty, which rules cover all energy products used for heating and transport, as well as 
electricity. The primary goal of EU energy tax legislation is to ensure that the Single Market runs 
smoothly and to prevent distortions in competition and trade within the EU. In addition, energy 
taxation can play an important role in achieving wider EU goals. In particular, it can help achieve 
Europe's objective of becoming a competitive, low-carbon and energy efficient economy. 
Current EU rules for taxing energy products and electricity are laid down in the Energy Tax 
Directive 2003/96/EC, which entered into force on 1 January 2004. This Directive includes: a common 
EU framework for taxing motor fuels, heating fuels and electricity; minimum rates for energy products 
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used as motor or heating fuel; minimum rates for commercial and industrial purposes, such as 
agriculture, stationary motors and machinery used in construction and public works; some options for 
exemptions for use of energy products and electricity; special provisions for commercial diesel, and 
finally, out of the scope provisions for energy products and electricity. The aim of this legislation is to 
reduce distortions caused by divergent national tax rates, remove competitive distortions between 
mineral oils and other (unlegislated) energy products, and create incentives for energy-efficiency and 
emission reductions (EC, 2003). 
In 2011, the Commission presented a proposal to revise the Energy Tax Directive. The aim of the 
proposal was to modernize EU rules on energy taxation. It seeks to restructure the taxation of energy 
products, in order to remove current imbalances and distortions, and support the EU's wider 
environmental and energy goals. A key feature of the proposal is to tax energy in a way that reflects 
both its CO2 emissions and its energy content. Energy taxes would be split into these two components 
to determine the overall rate at which the fuel is taxed. The proposal also makes a distinction between 
sectors covered by the EU ETS and those that are not, to avoid double taxation. The proposal is still 
under discussion by Member States in Council (EC, 2011). 
Secondly, carbon capture and geological storage (CCS) is worth mentioning. CCS is a technique 
for trapping carbon dioxide emitted from large point sources such as power plants, compressing it, and 
transporting it to a suitable storage site where it is injected into the ground. This technology has 
significant potential to help mitigate climate change both in Europe and internationally, particularly in 
countries with large reserves of fossil fuels and a fast-increasing energy demand.  
The biggest challenge related to this policy is the fact that the cost of capture and storage remains 
an important barrier to the take-up of CCS. The capture component in particular is an expensive part of 
the process. As flue gas from coal or gas-fired power plants contains relatively low concentrations of 
CO2 (10-12% for coal and around 3-6% for gas), the amount of energy needed to capture the gas 
makes the process costly (EC, 2015c). 
It is important to highlight that the Commission's proposal for a 2030 climate and energy policy 
framework acknowledges the role of CCS in reaching the EU's long-term emissions reduction goal. 
According to the 2030 framework, in the power sector, CCS could be a key technology for fossil fuel-
based generation and it could help balance an electricity system with increasing shares of variable 
renewable energy (EC, 2013c). However, it should be emphasized that in order to ensure that CCS can 
be deployed in the 2030 timeframe, increased R&D efforts and commercial demonstration are essential 
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over the next decade. A supportive EU framework will be necessary through continued and 
strengthened use of auctioning revenues. 
Next environmental policy is related to clean air. Air quality is an area in which the European 
Union has been very active. Since the early 1970s, the EU has been working to improve air quality by 
controlling emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere, improving fuel quality, and by 
integrating environmental protection requirements into the transport and energy sectors. As the result, 
much progress has been made in tackling air pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, lead, nitrogen oxides, 
carbon monoxide and benzene. However, as outlined above, and despite the progress made, air quality 
continues to cause serious and avoidable problems. 
The European Commission has recently carried out a comprehensive review of existing EU air 
policy in 2011-2013, building on the 2005 Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution (EC, 2005). Drawing on 
the conclusions from this review, the Commission has adopted a Clean Air Policy Package in 
December 2013, consisting of A new Clean Air Programme for Europe with new air quality objectives 
for the period up to 2030, a revised National Emission Ceilings Directive with stricter national 
emission ceilings for the six main pollutants, and a proposal for a new Directive to reduce pollution 
from medium-sized combustion installations. 
European legislation on air quality is built on certain principles. The first of these is that the 
Member States divide their territory into a number of zones and agglomerations, where the Member 
States should undertake assessments of air pollution levels using measurements and modeling and other 
empirical techniques. Where levels are elevated, countries should prepare an air quality plan or 
program to ensure compliance with the limit value before the date when the limit value formally enters 
into force. In addition, information on air quality should be disseminated to the public (EC, 2013d). 
Last but not least to be mentioned is the fact that the European Union has long been committed to 
international efforts to tackle climate change and felt the duty to set an example through robust policy-
making at home. At European level a comprehensive package of policy measures to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions has been initiated through the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP). Each of 
the EU Member States has also put in place its own domestic actions that build on the ECCP measures 
or complement them (EC, 2014e). 
Thus as the single energy market was being gradually put in place, the purpose of EU energy 
policy and the role expected of the market was changing. EU energy policy is now gearing up to a 
long-term transition to a secure, efficient, low-carbon energy system. The market should facilitate cost-
effective development of the varied resources in Europe – natural, technical, industrial – which will 
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together make up the transition. The focus has shifted from specific support schemes to market 
integration of early movers, new technologies, and more broadly, to how different resources, players 
and policies interact, positively and negatively, in the market (IIEA, 2015). 
Limited availability of internal energy resources and growing energy consumption has made the 
EU increasingly dependent on energy imports. Simultaneously, the limited ability of the atmosphere to 
withstand increased GHG emissions have put further pressure to develop a sustainable European 
energy sector (Müller-Kraener, 2008). Energy security has emerged as the primary challenge for 
Europe‘s energy policy. 
Having considered the framework of how the EU energy policy evolved and according to what 
conditions it modified, let‘s now analyze the most recent trends of the EU energy policy. The goals of 
the EU energy policy were defined by the Council of the European Union and are as follows: 
 increasing security of supply; 
 ensuring the competitiveness of EU economies and the availability of affordable energy;  
 promoting environmental sustainability and combating climate change (EC, 2007a).  
Energy policy is no longer a matter exclusive to the national administrations, as nowadays 
Brussels performs an active, although still limited, role in this field. 
This transition in the governance of energy policy in Europe is reflected in chapter 4 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where energy appears as a ‗shared competence‘ 
between the EU and its member states – as in the case of the internal market, the environment and 
the trans-European networks (Morata and Sandoval, 2012). This effort to better coordinate actions in 
the energy field is reflected in art. 194 of the TFEU on energy, which argues as follows: 
―In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the 
need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of 
solidarity between Member States, to: (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure 
security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy 
networks.‖ (art. 194.1, TFEU, 2007) 
In spite of the current financial and economic crisis, the energy policy area remains one of the 
key concerns both at European and national levels. Since energy is the ‗blood‘ of modern societies and 
the whole economic and social well-being of the European peoples and European industry relies on 
safe, secure, sustainable and affordable energy, there are those in Europe who argue that energy policy 
is to be ‗the next great European integration project‘ (EC, 2010b). The pressing importance of current 
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challenges such as climate change and energy security has made the creation of European energy 
policy an essential pre-requisite for the construction of the Europe of the twenty-first-century, and the 
European institutions have therefore called for a ‗revolution in the energy systems‘ to face the 
challenging global context that hastens the decarbonization of the European economy (Morata and 
Sandoval, 2012, p.4). 
It was not until March 2007 that the EU heads of state and governments endorsed the first EU 
―energy action plan‖. Following a series of discussions over the previous years, the Commission‘s ―An 
energy policy for Europe‖ strategy marks the beginning of a more integrated European energy policy, 
which gained considerable momentum since then. The action plan laid out the three major challenges 
for European energy policy, which form the core of the common energy policy till today: sustainability, 
security of supply, and competitiveness. In order to reach these goals the commission also laid out 
quantifiable targets. In its ―action plan 2007-2009‖ the Council adopted many of the Commission's 
proposals, among them the famous ―20/20/20‖ targets, which defined European energy policy in recent 
years. These targets refer to three 20% goals, to be reached until 2020 include the following. Firstly, a 
reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels (to be increased to 30% in 
the event that other industrial countries and economically more advanced developing countries also 
contribute adequately). Secondly, a 20% of EU energy consumption to come from renewable resources. 
Thirdly, a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levels, to be achieved by 
improving energy efficiency (EC, 2010a).  
The plan included a range of other working areas, most prominently the completion of the 
internal market for gas and electricity, issues concerning security of supply, internal energy policies 
and energy technologies. The Council invited the Commission to come forward with proposals in order 
to regulate the respective areas (Langsdorf, 2011). 
The action plan was complemented with changes in EU legislation shortly afterwards: the Lisbon 
Treaty finally included a title on energy. The article 12 first refers to the ―functioning of the internal 
market‖ sticking to its roots, but then enumerates several innovations (Langsdorf, 2011). Firstly, to 
ensure the functioning of the energy market. Secondly, to ensure security of energy supply in the 
Union. Thirdly, to promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy. Last but not least, to promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
There have been targets set already for 2030 and 2050, which will be considered in the following 
section. To summarize this section, the EU has already passed a long way on making its energy policy 
secure and diverse and continues doing it now as well, which is further studied in the next section. 
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3.2 NEW TRENDS IN EU ENERGY POLICY 
 
While the sustainability of Europe‘s energy sector has become urgent issues for the EU, the 
increasing import dependency has gained increased attention in the EU. The EU is the world‘s third 
largest energy consumer (Eriksson, 2011) and the primary energy consumption is gradually growing as 
evidenced in the previous sections. As of 2014, more than half (53.4 %) of the EU-28‘s gross inland 
energy consumption in 2012 came from imported sources (Eurostat, 2014b). 
 Security of energy supply means ensuring continuous and adequate supplies of energy from all 
sources to all users. For fossil fuels, the International Energy Agency projects an increasing EU 
reliance on imported oil from around 80% today to more than 90% by 2035. Similarly, gas import 
dependency is expected to rise from 60% to more than 80%. Rising demand for energy at global scale 
and insufficient competition in EU energy markets has sustained high commodity prices. In 2012, 
Europe's oil and gas import bill amounted to more than €400 billion representing some 3.1 % of EU 
GDP compared to around €180 billion on average in the period 1990-2011. This increases the EU's 
vulnerability to supply and energy price shocks (EC, 2014f). 
The origin of EU-28 energy imports has changed somewhat in recent years, as Russia has 
maintained its position as the main supplier of crude oil and natural gas and emerged as the leading 
supplier of solid fuels. In 2012, some 33.7% of the EU-28‘s imports of crude oil were from Russia, 
slightly below the shares recorded for 2010 (34.7%) and 2011 (34.8%). Russia became the principal 
supplier of solid fuels in 2006, overtaking South Africa, having overtaken Australia in 2004 and 
Colombia in 2002. Russia‘s share of EU-28 solid fuels imports rose from 13.1% in 2002 to 30% by 
2009, before falling somewhat to 25.9% by 2012. Despite this contraction, Russia remained the 
primary source of solid fuels imports into the EU in 2012, although its share was only slightly ahead of 
those recorded for Colombia (23.7%) and the United States (23%). By contrast, Russia‘s share of EU-
28 imports of natural gas declined from 45.2% to 29.5% between 2002 and 2010, but this trend was 
reversed with increases in 2011 and 2012. Qatar‘s share of EU-28 imports of natural gas rose from less 
than 1% in 2002 to 11% in 2011, before dropping back to 8.4% in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014b).  
The EU‘s import dependence is not in itself a security issue, since a steady supply of energy 
could be achieved from energy exporting countries. However, the worrying political developments in 
many energy rich countries, with the exception of Norway, have made several energy exporting 
countries unreliable and unpredictable sources of energy supplies. Political, economical and ethnical 
conflicts in energy exporting countries may cause supply interruptions to Europe and hamper necessary 
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investments in energy infrastructure. Energy industries in most exporting countries are subject to 
extensive governmental control which adds to the fear that energy can increasingly be used as a 
political weapon (Eriksson, 2011). Therefore, now the main issue of security of energy supply is clearly 
not availability, but reliability and stability of supply. 
The security of the EU‘s primary energy supplies may be threatened if a high proportion of 
imports are concentrated among relatively few partners. More than three quarters (76.8%) of the EU-
28‘s imports of natural gas in 2012 came from Russia, Norway or Algeria — as such there was a 
greater concentration of imports than in the previous two years as the same three countries accounted 
for 71% of natural gas imports in 2010 and 72% in 2011. A similar analysis shows that 53.6% of EU-
28 crude oil imports came from Russia, Norway and Saudi Arabia in 2012, while 72.6% of hard coal 
imports were from Russia, Colombia and the United States. Although their import volumes remain 
relatively small, there was some evidence of new partner countries emerging between 2002 and 2012. 
This was notably the case for crude oil imports from Nigeria, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, or natural 
gas imports from Qatar (Eurostat, 2014b). 
The political developments in Russia towards a more authoritarian political system have strained 
the EU‘s relation with its main energy supplier. Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas company, is 
today the dominating actor on the European gas market and has become an important tool in Russia‘s 
foreign policy. European policy-makers have become increasingly critical to Gazprom‘s dominance on 
the European gas market, pushing diversifying European energy imports (Eriksson, 2011).  
Simultaneously, the unstable situation in the Middle East has increased the instability of the 
international energy market. Consequently, the Middle East and North African regions have 
increasingly been considered unreliable energy suppliers. Import dependence of energy supplies is 
clearly one of the most urgent security issues, as declared by the EU in its European Security Strategy 
(EC, 2014a). However, import dependency does not alone constitute the EU‘s vulnerability to energy 
shortages or energy crises.  
Therefore, the new trends in the EU energy policy are inevitably related to the diversification of 
energy sources and strengthening energy security of the Community. Consequently, the European 
energy strategy is based on the three core pillars (EC, 2007b):  
- sustainability, to be achieved through actions including the development of competitive 
renewable energy sources, the diffusion of alternative transport fuels, the curbing of energy demand 
within Europe, the development of global actions to halt climate change and improve local air quality;  
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- security of supplies, that means tackling EU‘s rising dependence on imported energy through 
integrated approaches. Possible approaches includes the promotion of demand reduction, the support 
for growing diversification of EU‘s energy mix, with greater use of indigenous and renewable energy 
sources, the geographical differentiation of importers, the promotion of investments in energy-efficient 
technologies;  
- competitiveness, implying the promotion of a functional, open and competitive internal energy 
market in order to allow improvements in the efficiency of energy grids, a decrease in energy prices, an 
increase in investments in clean energy production and energy efficiency, an overall improvement of 
EU economy in the global scenario. 
Based on these European energy strategy objectives, which define the current development of the 
energy sector, it is important to refer to the 20/20/20 strategy once more within the framework of this 
section.  
The EU seeks to have a 20 % share of its gross final energy consumption from renewable sources 
by 2020; this target is distributed between the Member States with national action plans designed to 
plot a pathway for the development of renewable energies in each Member State. Figure B1 in 
appendix B shows the latest data available for the share of renewable energies in gross final energy 
consumption and the targets that have been set for each country for 2020. The share of renewables in 
gross final energy consumption stood at 14.1 % in the EU-28 in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014a). 
Thus, with the help of the graph B1, it is possible to assess new trends in the EU energy policy, 
as stated in the title of the section, taking future goals into account. As can be seen, Scandinavian 
countries are the most active and successful in implementing the use of renewables and reaching their 
2020 targets.  
According to the Eurostat Press Release as of March 2014, among the EU Member States, the 
highest share of renewables in gross final energy consumption in 2012 was recorded in Sweden (51%), 
while Latvia, Finland and Austria each reported that more than 30% of their final energy consumption 
was derived from renewables. Compared with the most recent data available for 2012, the targets for 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom require each of these Member States to increase their share of 
renewables in final energy consumption by at least 10 percentage points. By contrast, Denmark, 
Sweden, Bulgaria and Estonia had already surpassed their targets for 2020 (Eurostat, 2014c).  
It can be highlighted that after a period up to 2010 during which renewables were growing 
strongly, the combined effect of warm weather, slower progress by Member States in implementing the 
Renewable Energy Directive and Europe‘s faltering economic situation led to a decrease in the use of 
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renewable energy in 2011. However, the share of renewable sources in gross final consumption of 
energy did increase, since the consumption of fossil fuel energy fell more than that of renewables. In 
2012 the share of energy from renewable sources increased again and reached 14.3% and increased 
further to 15% in 2013 (Eurostat, 2015a). 
In this perspective, the European Energy 2020 strategy focuses on five priorities that are defined 
as follows (EC, 2014a).  
Firstly, the main objective is achieving an energy-efficient Europe. Efforts to improve energy 
efficiency should consider the whole energy chain, from energy generation and transformation to 
distribution and consumption. Energy efficiency may be supported through technical innovations and 
investments, and it also concerns the empowerment of domestic and business consumers, their 
involvement in sustainable choices concerning energy savings, reduction of wastages and the switching 
to low-carbon technologies and fuels. Market instruments as emissions trading systems and taxation 
systems may be of great help in this framework.  
The second main priority is promoting a truly European integrated energy market. The hypothesis 
is that an integrated, interconnected and competitive market will lead to improvements in efficiency. 
Currently, Europe is largely fragmented into separate national energy markets characterized by 
monopoly or oligopoly.  
In order to promote market integration, the Commission has identified 12 priority corridors and 
areas, and 248 key energy infrastructure projects concerning energy transport networks. Specific 
emphasis is posed on the Southern Gas Corridor, as natural gas will probably continue to play a key 
role in the EU‘s energy mix in the coming years and gas can also gain importance as the back-up fuel 
for variable electricity generation. At the same time, smart meters and power grids are crucial for 
promoting renewable energies, energy savings and improvements in energy services (Eriksson, 2012). 
Finally, construction of new interconnections at Europe‘s borders should receive the same 
attention and policies as intra-EU projects in order to ensure the stability and security of supplies. 
The third objective is empowering consumers and achieving the highest level of safety and 
security. It is crucial to guarantee trust, protect consumers and to help them play an active role. As 
energy, in particular electricity, constitutes a substantial part of the total production costs of key 
European industries, it is crucial to provide affordable but cost-reflective and reliable supplies. 
Promoting cooperation, competition and common regulation between Member States can also 
contribute to diversification of supply sources. The internal market is also hampered when Member 
States are not fully interlinked, such as in the Baltic States. Energy policy is also responsible for 
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protecting European citizens from the risks of energy production and transport. For example, a 
controversial topic is nuclear power: currently, mainstream EU position is that Europe must continue to 
be a world leader in developing systems for safe nuclear power, the transport of radioactive substances, 
as well as the management of nuclear waste (MILESECURE-2050, 2013).  
International collaboration on nuclear safeguards plays a major role in ensuring nuclear security 
and establishing a solid and robust non-proliferation regime. In the oil and gas exploitation and 
conversion sector, the EU legislative framework should guarantee the highest level of safety and an 
unequivocal liability regime for oil and gas installations.  
The fourth priority is defined as extending Europe‘s leadership in energy technology and 
innovation. Decarbonization is strictly connected to technological shifts. New technologies will reach 
markets more quickly and more economically if they are developed through collaboration at the EU 
level. Europe-wide planning and management is therefore paramount for investment stability, business 
confidence and policy coherence. The Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan sets out a medium-term 
strategy.  
Main technologies to be developed concerns second-generation biofuels, smart grids, smart cities 
and intelligent networks, Carbon Capture and Storage, electricity storage and electro-mobility, next-
generation nuclear, renewable heating and cooling. The resources required in the next two decades for 
the development of these technologies are very significant, especially when seen in the context of the 
current economic crisis. The EU is facing fierce competition in international technology markets; 
countries such as China, Japan, South Korea and the USA are pursuing an ambitious industrial strategy 
in solar, wind and nuclear markets (EC, 2010b). 
Last but not least, the fifth priority is strengthening the external dimension of the EU energy 
market. As emphasized in the Communication ―The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond 
Our Borders‖, the Commission supports intergovernmental energy agreements between Member States 
and third countries in order to pursue security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability (EC, 
2010b). Both relations with producing and transit countries, and relations with large energy consuming 
countries developing countries are of great importance. The EU already has a series of complementary 
and targeted frameworks ranging from specific energy provisions in bilateral agreements with third 
countries (Free Trade Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Association Agreements, 
etc.) and Memoranda of Understanding on energy cooperation, through to multilateral Treaties such as 
the Energy Community Treaty and participation in the Energy Charter Treaty. At the same time, more 
effective coordination at EU and Member State level is needed. Of course, the external dimension of 
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EU energy policy must be coherent with other external dimensions concerning development, trade, 
climate and biodiversity, enlargement, Common Foreign and Security Policy, etc (EC, 2010b).. 
The main place in the current trends of the EU energy policy is devoted to renewable energy 
policy and its role in reaching the goals of energy security and sustainability. The existing EU energy 
and environmental policy package includes numerous strategies, directives and regulations. The most 
significant of which are:  
 Europe 2020 - a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth;  
 A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050;  
 EU Emissions trading system; the security of supply directive;  
 the third internal energy market package;  
 renewable energy directive, the energy efficiency directive and carbon capture and geological 
storage directive.  
Recently, a number of proposals relating to the EU energy sector have been put forward, 
including: a trans-European energy infrastructure regulation, the connecting Europe facility and 
guidance to Member States on state intervention in electricity markets. To increase the use of energy 
from renewable sources is among the main objectives of EU energy policy. To develop renewable 
sector as well as to meet the energy objectives established in the Europe 2020 Energy strategy and in 
the Roadmap 2050, the EC adopted the directive 2009/28/EC focusing on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable energy sources. The directive 2009/28/EC approved mandatory targets of a 
20% share of energy from renewable sources in overall EU energy consumption by 2020 and a 10% 
target for each Member State regarding the share of renewable energy consumption in transport by 
2020, which was already mentioned earlier (EREC, 2013). 
It must be emphasized that to access the grid is essential for renewable power plants. Therefore, 
the directive 2009/28/EC requires that transmission system operators and distribution system operators 
all over the EU guarantee the transmission and distribution of electricity produced from RES. When 
dispatching electricity, transmission system operators are to give priority to installations using RES so 
far as the secure operation of the national electricity system allows it.  
Additionally, steps towards the development of infrastructure for energy transmission and 
distribution, smart grids and storage facilities must be taken, so as to facilitate a secure operation of the 
electricity system as it integrates electricity production from RES.  
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In addition, the directive establishes cooperation mechanisms by which Member States can join 
together to develop RES. Using such mechanisms aims at overcoming national approaches towards a 
joint European perspective to the development of renewable energy. They include: 
1) statistical transfers whereby one Member State with a surplus of renewable energy can sell it 
statistically to another Member State, whose renewable energy sources may be more expensive. 
One Member State gains a revenue, at least covering the cost of developing the energy, the 
other gains a contribution towards its target at lower cost; 
2) joint projects whereby a new renewable energy project in one Member State can be co-financed 
by another Member State and the production shared statistically between the two. Joint projects 
can also occur between a Member State and a third country, if the electricity produced is 
imported into the EU, (e.g. from North Africa); 
3) joint support schemes whereby two or more Member States agree to harmonize all or part of 
their support schemes for developing renewable energy, to clearly integrate the energy into the 
single market, and share out the production according to a rule (EC, 2011b). 
It should be highlighted that the Renewable Energy Directive also proposed to translate the EU 
20% target into individual targets for each Member State. As a consequence, binding national targets 
for RES shares over final energy consumption have been introduced in each Member State. Moreover, 
to ensure that the mandatory national overall targets are achieved, Member States established National 
Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP) as well. 
Moreover, the most Member States have experienced significant growth in renewable energy. 
Austria, Finland, Latvia, Sweden have the highest share of renewables in their energy mix, between 
30% and 45%; Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania showing the penetration of renewable 
in total energy mix between 20% and 25%. Conversely, Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and United Kingdom have the lowest share of renewables in energy consumption (3-4%), 
while it is 0.4% for Malta (IEA, 2011).  
In spite of the fact that Member States have experienced growth in renewable energy, based on a 
variety of studies (EC, 2013; EREC, 2013) the achievement of the ambitious 2020 and 2050 RES 
targets, however, is still hindered by numerous barriers, which should be mentioned within the scope of 
analysis in this section.  
Firstly, there are some economic and market barriers, which mean that RES not cost-competitive 
under current market conditions: high capital costs, unfavorable market pricing rules, subsidies for 
competing fuels, long reinvestment cycles of building-integrated technologies, etc. Secondly, there are 
55 
 
a number of legal barriers, including inefficient administrative procedures such as high number of 
authorities involved, lack of coordination among authorities, lack of transparent procedures, long lead 
times, high costs for applicants.  Thirdly, infrastructural and grid-related barriers (mainly power grids, 
but also gas and district heat) meaning that grid access is difficult to obtain, lack of available grid 
capacity). Fourthly, lack of skilled labor is also important issue (e.g. for planning and installation), it 
also includes problems with the guarantee and warranty and maintenance regime; lack or shortcomings 
of certification schemes for installers. 
Moreover, there are information and social acceptance barriers such as lack of knowledge (about 
benefits of RES, about available support measures); lack of acceptance (opposition to RES plants and 
power lines, public concerns about sustainability of biofuels). Finally, the economic instability - the 
changed economic climate has clearly an impact (fully or partially) on the development of new 
renewable energy projects and national renewable energy action plans commitments are also important 
issues nowadays. 
It is also worthwhile to refer again to the report prepared by the European Environment Agency 
and a consortium led by CE Delft as of 2014, which concludes on current measures taken with respect 
to innovation in the renewables sector. According to the report, fossil fuel support seems to mostly take 
the form of fiscal exemptions and allowances to certain users of fossil fuels. In countries that mine 
fossil fuels, specific grants for the use of these resources also apply (e.g. coal in the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Spain), lignite (Germany and Slovenia), oil (Norway) or natural gas 
(the Netherlands and Norway). Because support for fossil fuels mainly takes the form of tax 
exemptions, it represents revenue forgone by governments, and therefore has an impact on public 
budgets. Fossil fuel support in Europe is mostly oriented towards consumption.  
Meanwhile, the support for renewable energy is a mix of surcharges on end-users' energy bills 
and governmental support. For renewable electricity, the main policy tool is a FIT/FIP or a quota 
obligation which, in most cases, is financed through a surcharge on electricity bills. As such, support 
for renewable electricity is mainly oriented towards production, and does not place a burden on the 
public budget but rather on the final consumer. However, there is an exception here, namely the Czech 
Republic, where one third is paid from the state budget. Were the merit order effect to be passed on to 
the end consumer, the net effect on the electricity bill could be lowered. For renewable heat, however, 
support is more diversified, with investment support and grants being applied together with FITs/FIPs, 
so as to increase small-scale renewable heat uptake in buildings. This support is usually allocated from 
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the government's (national or regional) budget or EU structural funds, and therefore could represent a 
burden on the public budget (EEA, 2014).  
It is also important to consider the most recent trends of the EU energy policy, which are directed 
into the long term future.  
First to be mentioned is that the EU countries have agreed on a new 2030 Framework for climate 
and energy, including EU-wide targets and policy objectives for the period between 2020 and 2030. 
These targets aim to help the EU achieve a more competitive, secure and sustainable energy system and 
to meet its long-term 2050 greenhouse gas reductions target. These 2030 targets include 
 a 40% cut in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 levels; 
 at least a 27% share of renewable energy consumption; 
 a 30% improvement in energy efficiency (compared to projections) (EC, 2013b). 
To meet the targets, the European Commission has proposed the following. Firstly, a reformed 
EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) is needed. Secondly, new indicators for the competitiveness and 
security of the energy system, such as price differences with major trading partners, diversification of 
supply, and interconnection capacity between EU countries are to be developed. Moreover, it provided 
first ideas on a new governance system based on national plans for competitive, secure, and sustainable 
energy. These plans will follow a common EU approach and ensure stronger investor certainty, greater 
transparency, enhanced policy coherence and improved coordination across the EU (EC, 2013b). 
According to this document, in the future, the benefits of renewable energy must be exploited in a 
way which is to the greatest extent possible market driven. The functioning of the ETS and the 
contribution to GHG reductions from renewables are closely interlinked and complementary. A 
greenhouse gas reduction target of 40% should by itself encourage a greater share of renewable energy 
in the EU of at least 27%. The Commission proposes, therefore, that this should be the EU's target for 
the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU (EC, 2014f). 
This EU level target will drive continued investment in renewable energy meaning, for example, 
that the share of renewable energy in the electricity sector would increase from 21% today to at least 
45% in 2030. Unlike in the current framework, the EU target would not be translated into national 
targets via EU legislation, thus leaving greater flexibility for Member States to meet their greenhouse 
gas reduction targets in the most cost-effective manner in accordance with their specific circumstances, 
energy mixes and capacities to produce renewable energy. 
The Transport White Paper established a goal to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from the 
transport sector by 60% by 2050 compared to 1990 and by around 20% by 2030 compared to emissions 
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in 2008. Greenhouse gas emissions increased by 33% during the period 1990 to 2007 but have since 
fallen on the back of high oil prices, increased efficiency of passenger cars and slower growth in 
mobility. This trend is expected to continue up until 2020 but greater efforts will be needed after 2020 
to reach the White Paper's targets. Further reduction of emissions from transport will require a gradual 
transformation of the entire transport system towards a better integration between modes, greater 
exploitation of the non-road alternatives, improved management of traffic flows through intelligent 
transport systems, and extensive innovation in and deployment of new propulsion and navigation 
technologies and alternative fuels (EC, 2014f). 
In order to provide a long term perspective on climate, energy and transport (a sector which 
accounts for a significant share of both GHG emissions and energy consumption), the European 
Commission came forward with three initiatives in 2011 based on a consistent analytical framework: 
the Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050, the Energy Roadmap 2050, 
and the Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient 
transport system (commonly referred to as the Transport White Paper) (EC, 2014f).  
The Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 is one of the long-term 
policy plans put forward under the Resource Efficient Europe flagship initiative intended to put the EU 
on course to using resources in a sustainable way. The Roadmap suggests that, by 2050, the EU should 
cut its emissions to 80% below 1990 levels through domestic reductions alone. It sets 
out milestones which form a cost-effective pathway to this goal - reductions of the order of 40% by 
2030 and 60% by 2040. It also shows how the main sectors responsible for Europe's emissions - power 
generation, industry, transport, buildings and construction, as well as agriculture - can make the 
transition to a low-carbon economy most cost-effectively (EC, 2011c). 
Moreover, energy efficiency will be a key driver of the transition. By moving to a low-carbon 
society, the EU could be using around 30% less energy in 2050 than in 2005. Households and 
businesses would enjoy more secure and efficient energy services. More locally produced energy 
would be used, mostly from renewable sources. As a result, the EU would be less dependent on 
expensive imports of oil and gas and less vulnerable to increases in oil prices. On average, the EU 
could save € 175-320 billion annually in fuel costs over the next 40 years (EC, 2011c). 
The EU has set itself a long-term goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% when 
compared to 1990 levels by 2050. The Energy Roadmap 2050 explores the transition of the energy 
system in ways that would be compatible with this greenhouse gas reductions target while also 
increasing competitiveness and security of supply. The Energy Roadmap set out four main routes to a 
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more sustainable, competitive and secure energy system in 2050: energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage. It combined these routes in different ways to create and 
analyze seven possible scenarios for 2050 (EC, 2011d). 
The Energy Roadmap 2050 involves the following objectives. First, decarbonising the energy 
system is technically and economically feasible. In the long-run, all scenarios that achieve the 
emissions reduction target are cheaper than the continuation of current policies. Second, increasing the 
share of renewable energy and using energy more efficiently are crucial irrespective of the particular 
energy mix chosen. Third, early infrastructure investments cost less and much of the infrastructure in 
the EU built 30 to 40 years ago needs to be replaced anyway. Immediately replacing it with low-carbon 
alternatives can avoid more costly changes in the future. Fourth, a European approach is expected to 
result in lower costs and more secure energy supplies when compared to individual national schemes. 
With a common energy market, energy can be produced where it is cheapest and delivered to where it 
is needed (EC, 2011d). 
Having overviewed the targets and objectives, it is now relevant to consider the issue of state 
policies that support renewables and alternative energy and the outlook for the development of such 
policies. One of the interesting features of the renewables is that the decoupling of day-ahead market 
prices and RES feed-in due to FIT regulations, may result in lower average day-ahead price levels and 
even in negative day-ahead prices for several hours each month. This is called a merit-order effect and 
it is important to be considered when analyzing future policies towards renewables.  
While in the long run support schemes for RES units are likely to be phased-out, and they will 
thus have to compete in a normal market setup, in the mid-term the power market structure may have to 
be adapted to the increasing effects of RES deployment. For the subsequent investigation the two 
relevant perspectives have to be taken into account (Hildmann, Ulbig and Andersson, 2013).  
The first is the producer perspective: how to keep the profitability of necessary dispatchable base 
and peak load power plants in a power market with high shares of RES. This problem arises, since in 
short- and mid-term, a completely RES based electricity production on its own is not able to provide 
the necessary production volume or the necessary reliability for fulfilling the load demand at all times 
throughout the year. Conventional power plants, whose generation output can be controlled, are still 
necessary for providing base and peak load demand, buffer the lack of wind and PV power feed-in 
during absences of wind & sunshine and, generally, cover the prediction error of variable RES power 
feed-in (Hildmann, Ulbig and Andersson, 2013).  
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According to German Energy Agency, one proposed solution for this problem was the 
implementation of capacity markets, where (conventional) power plants are rewarded not only for 
energy delivery but also for providing a firm power capacity. Capacity markets would help to reduce 
power plant investment risk as they provide an additional revenue stream for power plant owners (dena, 
2012).  
However, it should be taken into consideration that the introduction of such capacity markets 
would most likely add some new subsidy mechanism, preventing both an efficient functioning of the 
energy-only power market and, in the long run, an affordable energy transition to significant RES 
shares in the electricity sector. Therefore, this idea has to be thoroughly analyzed before possible 
implementation in order to avoid substituting one subsidizing scheme for another.   
The second perspective is the consumer perspective, namely how to lower the cost of FIT 
schemes and enable the transition to a less subsidized (and eventually true) power market. Out of the 
many possible support schemes for RES, FIT-based schemes turned out to be highly effective energy 
policy instruments. As a result, large-scale deployment of RES, especially wind and PV has been 
remarkably successful. The actual FIT payments, meaning the difference between FIT tariffs and 
hourly day-ahead market prices, is financed, for example, in Germany through an additional levy on 
electricity consumption. So, such situation occurs that the average German retail consumer electricity 
price is nowadays a midst the highest in Europe whereas the average day-ahead whole-sale electricity 
price is one of the lowest (Hildmann, Ulbig and Andersson, 2013). 
 Therefore, in order to prevent additional long term price increases, the consumer has the interest 
in lowering costs for FIT schemes and achieving the integration of RES power feed-in into competitive 
power market frameworks. 
To sum up, this section made an overview of the current trends in the EU energy policy and 
highlighted the current legislation in the area of energy security, the necessity for which appeared as 
import-dependence from Russia increased, and the way of renewables development analysis was 
conducted with respect to objectives and obstacles for future EU energy market development. 
Experience with the current 2020 framework indicates that while European and national targets can 
drive strong action by the Member States and growth in emerging industries they have not always 
ensured market integration, cost-efficiency and undistorted competition. The impact assessment 
indicates that a main target for greenhouse gas emissions reduction represents the least cost pathway to 
a low carbon economy which of itself should drive an increased share of renewable energy and energy 
savings in the Union. 
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3.3 THE ROLE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN THE ENERGY STRATEGY OF 
EU MEMBER STATES 
 
The question of how to secure energy supply is nowadays extremely relevant on the political 
agenda. However, the energy policy of the EU suffers not only from a shortage of domestic energy 
resources, but also from a lack of policy coordination at the EU level. This has probably much to do 
with the particular energy interests of the Member States.  
According to article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty, member states have the overall responsibility for 
securing their energy needs and shaping their energy mixes, thus making them adopt national energy 
policies that are not always synchronized with the overall EU energy goals or with other EU member 
states. Therefore, the goal of this section is to reflect on how the separate Member States support 
renewable sources policies and what role do they outline to the renewables in their energy strategies for 
the distant future. Moreover, the issue of how the national energy particularities may support or 
undermine the coherence of the EU‘s efforts aimed at designing and implementing common energy 
policy will be briefly considered within the framework of this section.  
Last but not least crucial factor is that the EU countries' strategies differ when it comes to 
supporting fossil fuels, so the renewable sector must compete with a unique price structure for these 
fuels in each country, therefore energy strategies of France, Germany and Spain will be analyzed 
separately in order to distinguish the differences in state support policies and features of energy sector 
developments. 
It is also worth mentioning why particularly three Member States were chosen for the analysis, 
namely Germany, France and Spain. Germany has been the most successful in implementing the 
renewable energy sources in the EU so far. It showed remarkable results in the usage of PVs as well as 
developed and among first successfully implemented various renewable and alternative support 
schemes, which served as an example for other EU members. Moreover, Germany has embarked on an 
ambitious project to transform its energy system by 2050 (so-called Energiewende), which is worth 
analyzing.  
As for France, for a long time, the general French position has been to maintain the current status 
quo while observing others in a wait-and-see approach. According to the World Nuclear Association, 
half of the EU‘s nuclear electricity is produced in only one country – France (World Nuclear 
Association, 2015), which provides interest in a more deep investigation, since the issue whether such 
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country would be willing to switch from mainly nuclear to renewable energy production. The political 
will to reduce the share of nuclear power to 50% from current 75% by 2025 clearly opens a new 
chapter for French energy policy in the electricity sector, which is worth to be analyzed. French energy 
transition plan is highly ambitious, at least on paper, and makes it interesting for investigation.  
Renewable Energy deployment in Spain is interesting since it has progressed rapidly in the past 
decade due to a convergence of several factors: a political will to meet the 2020 renewable energy and 
climate change objectives defined by the European Union, the existence of Research Centers that have 
spearheaded innovation and commercialization of renewable energy technologies as well as large 
amount of private sector investment. This country has enormous potential for the development of 
renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and geothermal in particular, and it is still at the stage of 
developing its potential, which makes it noteworthy to study. 
 
        3.3.1. GERMANY 
German policy makers have taken a fundamental policy decision to move towards a sustainable 
energy supply over the long term. In September 2010, the federal government adopted a comprehensive 
new strategy, the Energy Concept, which established the principles of a long‐term, integrated energy 
pathway to take the country to 2050 and which determined renewable energy as the cornerstone of 
future supply. The Energy Concept built on the success of previous policies, notably the Integrated 
Energy and Climate Programme of 2007, but adopted more ambitious goals (IEA, 2013). 
Therefore, Germany stepped onto the path towards becoming one of the world‘s most energy 
efficient and environment friendly economies, while at the same time seeking to maintain affordable 
energy prices and a high level of economic prosperity. A key feature of the Energy Concept was a 
proposal to extend the operating lifetime of the German nuclear power fleet by an average of 12 years, 
therefore postponing the nuclear power phase‐out agreed by the former government.  
Following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in March 2011, a political decision which 
enjoyed extensive public support was taken to accelerate the phase‐out of Germany‘s nuclear fleet by 
2022 starting with the immediate closure of the eight oldest plants. This decision, combined with the 
political target to further progress towards a low‐carbon energy sector, had a major impact on the 
German energy policy outlook, which resulted in the adoption of a second package of measures, 
needed to accelerate the energy transition. This second Energy Package, which completed what is 
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commonly known as the Energiewende, contained seven legislative measures to support renewable 
energy and grid expansion, promote energy efficiency, fund the reforms and reverse the previous 
decisions to extend the lifetime of the nuclear plants (IEA, 2013). 
Next a brief description of the place of renewables in a current German energy provision is 
provided with further outlining of the renewables role in the policy applications at the modern stage.  
I will start with the photovoltaic energy. So, Europe‘s strong PV market development until 2012 
was the result of a few countries taking the lead year after year, with German policymakers showing a 
constant commitment to supporting the development of PV. After the Spanish boom in 2008, Germany 
alone was the leading market in 2009, and consequently European growth as a whole was limited. In 
retrospect this can be seen as a consequence of the first phase of the financial crisis but also as a year of 
stabilization after the boom PV experienced in 2008. Major growth returned in 2010, with Germany 
achieving unprecedented installation numbers (EPIA, 2014). 
According to EPIA‘s 2014 report on photovoltaic energy, after holding the world‘s top PV 
market position seven times in the last 14 years, Germany was only fourth in 2013 with 3.3 GW, and 
yet still by far the largest European market. Moreover, Germany installed between 7.4 GW and 7.6 GW 
of PV from 2010 to 2012. In 2012, the record year for Germany allowed the European market to 
maintain a reasonable level of 17.7 GW of installations, with 11.4 GW coming from Germany and Italy 
alone. In 2013, the decline of Germany and Italy as the main drivers of the European market was 
confirmed. While the sum of the market in other countries remained around 6 GW, the drop in 
installations in Germany and Italy decreased the total European market to nearly 11 GW. Germany saw 
steady growth for nearly a decade and clearly represents the most developed PV market, despite the 
2013 market downturn (EPIA, 2014). 
In most countries however, PV remains a policy-driven market. The introduction, modification or 
phasing out of national support schemes, which heavily impact the development of PV markets and 
industries in these countries, also significantly influence EPIA‘s forecasts and scenarios. Indeed, 
declining political support for PV has led to reduced markets in several European countries, including 
Germany. 
Turning now to the wind power, it is important to highlight that in terms of annual wind power 
capacity installations, Germany was the largest market in 2014, installing 5,279.2 MW of new capacity, 
528.9 MW of which (10% of total capacity installed in Germany) offshore (EWEA, 2015). 
It is worthwhile to look at a national breakdown of wind power installations to understand how 
Germany has been driving the whole EU market since the very beginning. In 2000, the annual wind 
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power installations of the three pioneering countries – Denmark, Germany and Spain – represented 
85% of all EU wind capacity. By 2013, they represented only 36.2% of total installations. In 2014 
installations in the three pioneering countries together represented 45.6% of the EU market and were 
mainly driven by the 63% German market growth (EWEA, 2015). 
The next source is hydropower. Today, Germany has about 7,000 MW of installed pumped 
storage capacity. By 2020, new pumped storage hydropower plants with a capacity of about 2,500 MW 
will be added. For example, the project Atdorf in the southern part of the Black Forest is leading the 
current development of pumped storage schemes in Germany and Europe, in terms of overall electricity 
output, with an installed output of 1,400 MW, total capacity of 13 GWh and the ability to operate 9.5 
hours at full capacity (EURELECTRIC, 2011). 
The development of renewable energies and the changes resulting from this development require 
the energy industry to adjust generation and supply structures. Centralized, large-scale power 
generation technologies located close to consumption centers will be gradually replaced during the 
coming years by more volatile power generation technologies, which will be increasingly remote from 
consumption centers. Today, over 45,000 MW of PV and wind power are installed in Germany. In the 
National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP), the German government targeted an increase of 
this capacity to about 98,000 MW by 2020 (EREC, 2011). Table 2 shows capacity projections for 
renewable energy sources in Germany. 
 
Table 2. Existing and projected capacities for renewable energy sources in Germany 
 2010 NREAP 2020 
Wind-Onshore 27 GW 36 GW 
Wind-Offshore 0.2 GW 10 GW 
Photovoltaic 17 GW 52 GW 
Biomass 6.3 GW 8.9 GW 
Source: EURELECTRIC 2011, based on Power Statistics 2011; NREAPs; German Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
 
The promotion of renewable energy is a declared objective of the Federal Government. As a 
result of this priority status with guaranteed feed-in tariffs, there has been a strong increase in the share 
of renewable energy in the energy mix in recent years. While renewables only accounted for 6.7% of 
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electricity production in 2001, their share had grown to roughly 20% in 2011. With the current 
amendment to the Renewable Energy Sources Act, the Federal Government aims to increase the share 
of renewables in electricity production to 35% by 2020 and to even 80% by 2050 at the very latest 
(German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2012). 
However, the swift expansion of renewable energy does have its price. The feed-in tariff is 
financed by electricity consumers through the system of cost real-location under the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (known as the renewables surcharge or EEG surcharge). This surcharge is currently 3.59 
cent/kWh and will total roughly €14 billion in 2012. When the Renewable Energy Sources Act was 
introduced, the surcharge was 0.2 cent/kWh (German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 
2012). The graph below displays the dynamics of the surcharge development over the period of 2000-
2012 in Germany. 
 
Figure 6. Development of renewables surcharge from 2000-2012 in ct/kWh 
Source: Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
 
It is worthwhile to investigate how the renewables were incorporated into the German energy 
strategy and how the government enhanced the development of it. German feed-in tariffs (FITs) for the 
generation of electricity from renewable sources, under the EEG are entering their third phase of 
existence (Fulton, Capalino and Auer, 2012).  
In Phase One (2000-2009) Germany focused on scaling up domestic renewable electricity 
generation. With the costs of electricity from technologies such as solar PV far from cost 
competitiveness, Germany established a FIT policy design that provided transparency, longevity, and 
certainty (TLC) to investors. During this period, degressions in FIT rates were modest and adjustments 
to the EEG occurred at regular intervals.  
During Phase Two (2009-2011) rapid declines in the cost of solar PV modules prompted 
Germany to more actively adjust its PV FIT in order to manage the volume of annual PV installations 
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under its FIT programs (by, for example, linking FIT degressions for PV to the volume of PV 
installations in previous periods and reviewing the PV policy more frequently).  
In Phase Three (2012 – present time), continued cost declines are making solar PV, wind, and 
biomass increasingly competitive with traditional sources of electricity; in response, the key elements 
of Germany‘s 2012 EEG – including reduced FIT payments, a market premium option, a 90% cap on 
FIT-eligible PV electricity, and addition of a 52 GW PV capacity threshold – all mark an evolution of 
German FITs toward a ―grid parity‖ future where policy is more flexible and may offer less TLC to 
investors. Indeed, in terms of ―gird parity‖, the cost of electricity from small PV systems in Germany is 
in some cases already below retail rates (Fulton, Capalino and Auer, 2012). 
A central goal of Phase Three is to encourage renewable generators to behave more like 
conventional generators – chiefly, in considering the wholesale market value of the energy that they 
produce. Traditional FIT contracts reward the production of renewable electricity irrespective of where 
and when that electricity is produced.  
With respect to this, there is one more issue to be addressed by the German government regarding 
the development of the renewable and alternative energy, and this issue is the market integration of 
renewables which is becoming increasingly important. The problem is that due to the guaranteed sales 
and feed-in tariff under the Renewable Energy Sources Act, renewable electricity is also produced and 
fed into the grid even if there is no demand for power. This is because the plant operators also qualify 
to receive the feed-in tariff if their electricity is not needed.  
With a combined installed capacity of wind & PV units of around 70 GW by year-end 2013, 
somewhat higher than the average load demand in Germany (63–68 GW dependent on load demand 
measure), wind & PV units clearly cannot be treated as exotic, marginal electricity sources anymore. 
The current RES production has already significant effects on the power market, notably in the form of 
the so-called merit-order effect. Especially the decoupling of day-ahead market prices and RES feed-in 
due to FIT regulations, results in lower average day-ahead price levels and also in negative day-ahead 
prices for several hours each month. 
In today‘s European power market environment in which significant over-capacities exist, yearly 
average spot market prices as well as base-peak spreads in Europe are at their lowest in years. One 
effect of this is that flexible power plants such as gas-fired units cannot be operated profitably because 
peak day-ahead prices are too often below their marginal operation costs. Another effect is that due to 
the also decreasing spread of peak/base day-ahead prices, the profitability of operating energy storage 
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facilities, i.e., pumped storage hydro plants (PSHP) has been diminishing in recent years (Hildmann, 
Ulbig and Andersson, 2013). 
Therefore, while conventional power stations take their lead from the prices on the power 
markets and use this as their basis to control power plant operation, renewable energy plants can 
produce electricity regardless. Renewable energy systems are therefore immune to the pricing signal of 
the power market. Given the limited possibilities of storing electrical energy, however, this affects the 
electricity exchange: for example, prices drop when the supply of wind power is high particularly in 
times when low demand for electricity (e.g. holidays or weekends) coincides with high electricity 
production from renewable energy installations. The upshot is low or even negative electricity prices 
on the exchange. Non-demand-responsive production then causes electricity to be sold below value. In 
the case of negative prices, electricity providers even have to pay buyers to purchase their electricity. 
This may first sound impossible, but it does happen in reality.  
In Germany, rapid addition of wind and solar generation has resulted in the supply of electricity 
exceeding demand during several periods of the year, which has caused electricity market prices to 
plummet to zero (and below). While beneficial to some consumers (in the short term, at least), such  
The future integration of these variable power quantities requires a swift extension of national 
and European power storage capacities. The wind does not always blow and the sun does not always 
shine at the exact moment when consumers‘ power demands are high. Consequently, in order to make 
renewable energy available at times of peak demand, a large amount of storage capacity is required. 
Apart from the development of smart grids and the implementation of flexible generation plants, 
electricity storage facilities of any technology, such as pumped storage power plants, compressed-air 
reservoirs, accumulators, etc. will be of critical importance. 
          3.3.2. FRANCE 
France is the European Union‘s second largest producer and consumer of renewable energy. In 
2011, power generation from renewable energy sources represented 13.1% of France‘s electricity 
production (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2013). 
Rich in diverse renewable energy resources, France has the largest forest area in Western Europe, 
the second highest wind energy potential (with its 5,500 km of coastline) and extensive hydroelectric 
resources that make it the second largest market in Europe in terms of electricity capacity. In addition, 
the country‘s strong agricultural sector lends itself to the development of bio-energy and French 
overseas territories offer considerable potential for solar developments. 
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France's energy policy is focused mainly on nuclear power, which in 2011 accounted for 79 % of 
France‘s electricity production. Nevertheless, policy support for renewable energy has increased over 
the last decade and France moves slowly towards more sustainable resources of renewable electricity 
which should in time speed up the process of developing renewable energy projects (Norton Rose 
Fulbright, 2013). 
The two main sources of renewable energy in use in France are biomass and hydropower. RES 
currently being developed include wind energy, solar energy (thermal, photovoltaic and, in French 
overseas territories, concentration), hydroelectric and marine energy, bio-energy, geothermal energy, 
thermodynamic heating and hydrogen-based generation.  
As of March 2015, France derives about 75% of its electricity from nuclear energy, due to a long-
standing policy based on energy security. This share is to be reduced to 50% by 2025. Moreover, 
France is the world's largest net exporter of electricity due to its very low cost of generation, and gains 
over €3 billion per year from this. About 17% of France's electricity is from recycled nuclear fuel 
(World Nuclear Association, 2015).  
Total generating capacity (end 2014, RTE data) is 129 GWe, including 25.4 GWe hydro, 24.4 
GWe fossil fuel, 9.1 GWe wind and 5.3 GWe solar PV. Peak demand is about 100 GWe. In 2013 gross 
production was 424 TWh from nuclear, 76 billion kWh from hydro, 24.7 billion kWh from coal, 17.7 
billion kWh from natural gas, 20.6 from solar and wind, and 8.0 from biofuels & waste, of total 575 
TWh (World Nuclear Association, 2015). 
The present situation is due to the French government deciding in 1974, just after the first oil 
shock, to expand rapidly the country's nuclear power capacity, using Westinghouse technology. This 
decision was taken in the context of France having substantial heavy engineering expertise but few 
indigenous energy resources. Nuclear energy, with the fuel cost being a relatively small part of the 
overall cost, made good sense in minimizing imports and achieving greater energy security. 
As a result of the 1974 decision, France now claims a substantial level of energy independence 
and almost the lowest cost electricity in Europe. It also has an extremely low level of CO2 emissions 
per capita from electricity generation, since over 90% of its electricity is nuclear or hydro (World 
Nuclear Association, 2015). 
In 1999 a parliamentary debate reaffirmed three main planks of French energy policy: security of 
supply (France imports more than half its energy), respect for the environment (especially regarding 
greenhouse gases) and proper attention to radioactive waste management. It was noted that natural gas 
had no economic advantage over nuclear for base-load power, and its prices were very volatile. It was 
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accepted that there was no way renewables and energy conservation measures could replace nuclear 
energy in the foreseeable future. 
In 2005 a law established guidelines for energy policy and security. The role of nuclear power is 
central to this, along with specific decisions concerning the European Pressurized Water Reactor, 
notably to build an initial unit so as to be able to decide by 2015 on building a series of about 40 of 
them. It also set out research policy for developing innovative energy technologies consistent with 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions and it defined the role of renewable energies in the production of 
electricity, in thermal uses and transport. 
In October 2014 an energy transition bill was passed by the National Assembly and so went on to 
the Senate. Besides other goals, the document aims to reduce fossil fuel consumption by 30% by 2030 
relative to 2012; and to increase the share of renewables in final energy consumption to 32% by 2030 
(World Nuclear Association, 2015). 
So, as of now the structure of the national energy mix has remained relatively stable. According 
to the European Commission, nuclear energy continues to hold the highest market share (approximately 
43%), followed by oil products (32%) and natural gas (14%) (EC, 2014g). 
France has an obligation to reach 23% of RES share in gross final energy consumption by 2020. 
Despite the fact that France has stayed somewhat below its 2011/2012 interim target (12.8%), the share 
of renewable energy has nevertheless increased from 11.3% (2011) to 13.4% thus showing a positive 
trend (2012). This positive result is mainly due to contribution from the heating and cooling sector, 
which increased as a result of improved use of biomass (EC, 2014g).  
Latest statistics as of 2014 evidences that renewable energies continued to grow in 2012: +4.6% 
in the residential sector and +9.3% in the tertiary sector. Consumption of wood, which represents 80% 
of renewable energies in the residential sector, grew marginally due to the success of new high-
performance wood-burning appliances. The development of heat pumps continued: these reached 12% 
of household consumption of renewable energy. These strong developments of renewable energies are 
in line with previous years: Since 2007 an annual average rise of +4.5% in the residential sector and + 
6.7% in the tertiary sector (Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, 2014). 
According to the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan – 2014, the multiannual scheduling of 
heat investments (called ―heat PPI‖) expects a significant growth of the number of solar thermal 
collectors installed between 2006 and 2020. The fixed objective for the production of 817 ktep of 
renewable heat from individual solar thermal installations in 2020 translates into almost 30% of 
equipment in individual dwellings multiplying almost by 48, compared to 2005, the solar energy 
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generation in this sector. In the field of collective installations (collective housing, tertiary housing), the 
expected growth of collective solar energy corresponds to a multiplication factor of 11 of the 
production in 2005 in order to achieve 110 ktep in 2020. Financial aid for solar energy in the residential 
sector is integrated by a global policy for the development of renewable energy in the building sector 
(see Residential-tertiary section). Special emphasis has been placed within the 2012 Thermal 
Regulations, on encouraging the installation of individual solar water heaters for new private houses 
built from 2013. In the collective, tertiary, agricultural and industrial sectors, financial support for solar 
energy is guaranteed by the heat funds and by the CPER. The generation of renewable heat from solar 
power is growing with 133 ktep in 2012 against 49 ktep in 2005 (Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable 
Development and Energy, 2014).  
As for solar power, a significant growth in renewable energy generated by heat pumps thanks to 
heat PPI is expected by 2020. The objective of the total generation of renewable energy starting from 
PAC, in all sectors, was increased to 1 300 ktep in 2012 and to 1850 ktep for 2020 with a production in 
2012 estimated at 1 227 ktep. In the residential sector, financial support for the development of heat 
pumps falls within the global policy of financial support for the development of renewable energy in 
the building sector. Financial support for geothermal energy saw a sharp rise in 2010 including the 
expenses fronted to lay underground heat exchangers within the bases of Sustainable Development tax 
credit in favor of geothermal heat pumps. In the collective, tertiary, agricultural and industrial sectors, 
financial support to geothermal heat pumps is guaranteed by the heat funds (Ministry of Ecology, 
Sustainable Development and Energy, 2014).  
It should be also mentioned that the development of geothermal energy has been identified by 
France as one of the priority sectors for green growth and in the fight against climate change and is 
subject to a ‖green sector‖ approach‖. 
In France, electricity from renewable sources is promoted through a feed-in tariff and tax 
benefits. The generation of heat through renewable energy plants is promoted through several systems 
of energy subsidies, tax regulation mechanisms as well as through a zero percent-interest loan. The 
main support scheme for renewable energy sources used in transport is a quota system. Furthermore, 
biofuels are supported through fiscal regulation (RES LEGAL Europe, 2015).  
The use of the grid for the transmission of electricity from renewable sources is subject to the 
general legislation on energy. There are no special provisions for electricity from renewable sources. 
As far as heating and cooling is concerned, public distribution of heat in France is a competence of the 
local or regional authorities. The procedure of grid connection is at the same time also the procedure 
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for grid development, since the construction of a plant must occur simultaneously with the construction 
of the district heating grid.  
There are various policies aiming at promoting the development, installation and use of RES 
installations in France, including training programs, certification schemes or Research, Development 
and Demonstration (RD&D) programs. 
In general there are two types of training programs for installers of RES-systems: the association 
Qualit´EnR promotes quality installations in the field of solar thermal energy, photovoltaic, biomass as 
well as heat pumps. The organization Qualibat grants qualifications and certifications to professionals 
of the building trade, including installers of renewable energy plants (RES LEGAL Europe, 2015). 
As far as the exemplary role of public authorities is concerned, there is no program of the French 
government promoting the development of a specific renewable energy technology in public buildings. 
However, the Grenelle Building Plan was established in order to reach the targets set by the Grenelle of 
Environment in all building sectors, including public buildings (RES LEGAL Europe, 2015). 
There are two support schemes for RES-H infrastructures. The Heat Fund supports the 
production of heat through renewable energy plants as well as the use of district heating. Moreover, 
under certain conditions, the supply of heat through district heating networks can be subject to a 
reduced VAT of 5,5% (RES LEGAL Europe, 2015). 
It is also important to address main opportunities and challenges facing the renewable energy 
sector of France. Generally speaking, renewables are now the fastest-growing sector of the energy mix 
and offer great potential to address issues of energy security and sustainability. France will have to 
support and accelerate the development of renewable energies - and especially wind and solar power - 
in order to meet its obligations under the Renewable Energy Directive and have 23% of final energy 
demand from renewable sources by 2020. There are several reasons to suggest that this objective will 
be difficult to meet. 
Regulation of the RES sector supplies challenges as well as support. Frequent recent changes to 
legislation and regulation and the addition of new authorization requirements continue to hinder the 
pace of development of renewable energies. Moreover, strict compliance with the French legislation is 
key to the success of a renewable project. It is essential to build up relationships with contacts in 
France and patience is necessary as it is not uncommon to take up to four years to achieve results. 
Finally, French-speaking African countries show a growing interest in the development of renewable 
energies (such as in the Tarfaya site or the Ouarzazate site in Morocco) (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2013). 
Opportunities for renewable energy investments in Africa should diversify in the near future. 
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The last issue to be addressed within this section is renewable energy industry policy 
recommendations as provided in European Renewable Energy Council report ―Mapping Renewable 
Energy Pathways towards 2020‖ (EREC, 2011). 
In electricity sector, there have been frequent changes in regulations on authorization for 
renewable energy over the past years. It appears necessary to stabilize regulations so that operators can 
work in better conditions. There is no one-stop-shop for obtaining authorizations for RES-E projects, 
and this is a weak point in the existing system. The distribution grid needs urgent modernization and 
RES need to be favored on the grid. Furthermore, it is also essential to develop and strengthen grid 
infrastructure and grid lines in certain zones, especially where problems arise at the present time and in 
areas where RES projects are likely to be developed in the future. 
Turning now to heating and cooling sector, it would seem crucial to introduce a minimum level 
of RES in the overall consumption of buildings (e.g. by introducing a minimum consumption threshold 
of 5 kWh/m2 .year). For public buildings to fulfill an exemplary role by 2012, all constructions or 
major renovations of public buildings should incorporate a minimum level of RES. The budget of the 
―Fonds Chaleur‖ may be reviewed yearly and is therefore unstable. Another system of financing should 
be preferred. Finally, administrative procedures to install RES-H&C systems must be simplified 
(EREC, 2011). 
Now,  last to consider is the transport sector. Due to the current absence of a national scheme on 
the compliance of biofuels and other bioliquids to sustainability criteria, economic operators could 
favor the voluntary scheme in France. Indeed, economic operators are entitled to use the voluntary 
scheme that they have elaborated, provided this voluntary scheme has first been recognized by the 
European Commission and been through the comitology process. In terms of measures to ensure that 
economic operators submit reliable information and show that the sustainability criteria has been 
fulfilled, it would seem advisable for the main checking point to be at the custom level when fuels are 
put on the market, as there are already various control systems at this level. As far as voluntary 
certification schemes for the sustainability of biofuel and bioliquids are concerned, all options should 
be authorized, a national system or a voluntary scheme. However, in the latter, the economic operator 
may have more flexibility to design a system that is adapted to its economic constraints. SER estimates 
that public authorities could, via a FiT system or via subsidies, give premiums for installations using 
biomass coming from arable land, degraded land, etc., which would encourage their use for energy 






Spain is the fifth largest energy consumer in Europe and has virtually no domestic production of 
liquid fuels or natural gas. Government regulation limits the percent of total oil and gas imports any 
single country may sell to Spain to ensure diversity of supply.  
Liquid fuels are still the largest source of Spain's total energy consumption, mostly in the 
transportation sector. The country had nine refineries with a total crude oil refining capacity of almost 
1.3 million barrels per day as of January 2014, according to Oil & Gas Journal. However, Spain is still 
a net importer of petroleum products (EIA, 2015). 
Up until the 2008 financial crisis, Spain was one of the fastest-growing natural gas markets in 
Europe. Although growth has slowed since then, Spain still accounted for nearly two-thirds of LNG 
imports to OECD Europe in 2013. Spain fell to 6th largest global importer of LNG in 2013, as India, 
China, and Taiwan surpassed it, and Spanish imports have declined, according to IHS Energy (EIA, 
2015). 
Spain also receives significant natural gas supplies from Algeria through the undersea Maghreb-
Europe Gas Pipeline, which came on line in 2011 after a number of delays. In 2013, Algeria supplied 
39% of Spain's natural gas (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2014). 
Spain generates a significant amount of power from wind energy, the most of any country in 
Europe as of 2012. The Spanish government authorized offshore electricity generating facilities in 2007 
to promote the development of offshore wind energy. Renewable energy, including hydroelectric 
generation, accounted for 30% of Spain‘s power generation in 2012 Energy (EIA, 2015). 
Up until the 2008 recession, Spain was slowly phasing out its coal production subsidies. 
However, coal production and consumption increased in 2011 after the Spanish government introduced 
domestic coal production subsidies and gave preferential access to the wholesale power market to coal-
powered generators in an attempt to reduce the country's dependence on imported coal. This has caused 
electricity producers to substitute away from renewables to coal. In 2012, fossil fuels accounted for 
49% of Spain‘s electricity generation. According to the Framework Plan for Coal Mines and Mining 
Communities 2013-2018, production subsidies will end after 2018. 
There are eight operating nuclear reactors in Spain, which supplied about 21% of the country's 
electricity generation in 2012 (EIA, 2015). 
Spain consumed 14.9 Mtoe of renewable energy in 2011, which represented 11.6% of the 
country's primary energy consumption. Biomass, wind and hydropower are the main sources of 
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renewable energy. In terms of power generation, the gross renewable energy production amounted to 
86,600 GW h, or 29.7% of the country's total. This distribution implies that renewables are the main 
source of electrical energy for the country, surpassing natural gas (28.9%) and nuclear power (19.7%). 
The distribution within the renewable energy sector by type has indicated an 84% contribution by wind 
and hydropower (49% and 35%, respectively), which is an 11% decrease from 2010 due to a year of 
reduced hydraulic and wind resource availability (Montoya, Aguilera and Manzano-Agugliaro, 2014). 
The importance of the renewable energy sector to the Spanish economy has been growing, and its 
contribution will increase in the next few years. In constant terms based on 2010 values, the direct 
contribution of the renewable energy sector to Spain's gross domestic product (GDP) has shown 
positive development, accumulating a growth of approximately 56.7% over the period 2005–2009. 
Considering the published International Monetary Fund forecasts for the Spain's growth in GDP until 
2015, and assuming an annual growth of 2.5% between 2016 and 2020, the direct contribution of the 
country's renewable energy sector will represent 0.88% of its GDP in 2015 and 1.03% in 2020. The 
potential for Spanish renewable energy is broad, and far superior to its domestic energy demand and 
existing fossil-based energy resources (Montoya, Aguilera and Manzano-Agugliaro, 2014). 
Among these energies, the potential for solar energy is the highest. Expressed in terms of 
installable electrical power, Spain has the potential for several terawatts (TW) of solar energy. Wind 
power takes second place, with a potential estimated at approximately 340W. The country's 
hydroelectric potential, estimated at approximately 33 GW, is also very high, but the greater part of this 
potential has already been developed. The remaining technologies have a potential near 50 GW, the 
potential for wave and geothermal energy approximately 20 GW each. 
Spain has hours of sunshine than almost any other country in Europe, along with the countries in 
the Mediterranean arc, and therefore offers optimal conditions for solar energy. Meanwhile, wind 
energy, the fastest-growing form of sustainable energy, has surmounted many of the issues associated 
with more conventional fuels, making it not simply an alternative but a viable, mainstream form of 
power generation. Spain has been a leader in the deployment of wind energy. Spanish wind turbine 
manufacturers are international leaders, being among the world's 10 largest manufacturers and 
commanding a joint market share of 16.4% in 2002.  
Of the renewable energy sources, wind energy has experienced the greatest growth in Spain 
during the last decade. The diffusion of on-shore wind power over the period 1995–2004 has been 
described as impressive and made Spain the second in wind energy installed capacity, behind only 
Germany and on par with the US (Graber, 2005). In just 12 years, the contribution of wind energy has 
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gone from being considered insignificant to playing a substantial role in the country's electrical 
balance. At the end of 2012, wind had generated approximately 22,622 MW of power in Spain, with an 
electrical output above 48,212 GW h and met approximately 18% of the total national electricity 
demands, having occasionally surpassed 21% of monthly demands and even 60% coverage in terms of 
hourly delivery (Montoya, Aguilera and Manzano-Agugliaro, 2014). 
Hydropower is dependent on a country's geography. Spain has a significant, consolidated 
hydroelectric generation system resulting from a long historical tradition of hydropower development 
due to the country's terrain and a large number of dams. The total capacity of the country's reservoirs is 
55,000 H m
3
, and 40% of that capacity corresponds to hydroelectric dams, of which Spain has one of 
the highest proportions in Europe and the world. Spain ranks fifth in hydroelectric power at the 
European level, after Sweden, France, Austria, and Italy.  
It is interesting to note how the production of energy rises and falls depending on annual rainfall. 
For example, 2010 was a very rainy year in Spain, resulting in a peak production of 6748 GW h, in 
contrast to 2011 and 2012, when rainfall was lower and production dropped to 5280 GW h and 4620 
GW h, respectively. On the other hand, the country's installed capacity has been essentially stable in the 
last few years. Only 19 MW have been put into operation in the past three years (although 2 MW were 
uninstalled), which brought the total installed power in Spain to 2035 MW by the end of 2012 
(Montoya, Aguilera and Manzano-Agugliaro, 2014). 
Therefore, the Renewable Energies Plan 2005–2010 objective of 2199 MW has not been fulfilled. 
The causes of this low capacity have included the risk arising from this type of project, the increasing 
complexity of the business, and administrative obstacles that make obtaining permits and licenses for 
power installation a difficult and costly process in terms of time and resources. 
The installed forecasts for 2015 and 2020 included in the plan for renewable energies have been 
updated in the 2011–2020 plan, with more reasonable objectives, to be 2017 MW and 2185 MW, 
respectively (EREC, 2011). 
Aside from the solar, wind, biomass, and hydraulic sectors, the development of other renewable 
energy sources has still been very limited in Spain, and production has focused on demonstration 
projects with the objective of establishing more efficient prototypes. The two most advanced 
technologies in this sector have been marine and geothermal energy.  
Spain has a long coastline and good wave energy resource that could significantly contribute to 
its renewable energy mix. While the development of marine technology is still in its infancy, the 
industry has been primarily focused on wave and current technology. There are nearly 30 active 
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projects (technological and normative-methodological) in development on the Spanish coast, with an 
estimated investment of more than 230 million Euros. These investments are located mainly in the 
northern coastal regions of Spain and the Basque Country, Cantabria, Asturias, and Galicia, as well as 
in the Canary Islands. The Renewable Energies Plan for 2011–2020 has estimated a marine energy 
production potential of 220 GW h and established a series of measures to promote the deployment of 
100 MW of marine energy by 2020 (Montoya, Aguilera and Manzano-Agugliaro, 2014).. 
Despite the large estimated geothermal energy resources in Spain (approximately 19,000 MW, of 
which 1000 MW could be exploited), their exploitation would be expensive and require further 
technological development. The Renewable Energies Plan of 2011–2020 has set a goal of 50 MW by 
2020 and estimated that the first plants will be operational by 2017. There are boreholes and small 
facilities located at several places across the country, mostly on the Mediterranean coast and near 
Madrid. Spain installed 22.3 MW by 2007, using 347.2 TJ/yr with a capacity factor of 0.49 (Spain's 
National Renewable Energy Action Plan 2011-2020, 2010). 
In Spain, the generation of electricity from renewable sources is mainly promoted through a price 
regulation system. Plant operators may choose between two options: a guaranteed feed-in tariff and a 
guaranteed bonus (premium) paid on top of the electricity price achieved on the wholesale market. 
In Spain, renewable energy plants are statutorily entitled to priority access to, connection to and 
use of the grid. Renewable electricity is granted priority dispatch in the electricity markets at no cost, 
provided the stability and security of the grid infrastructure can be maintained. Renewable energy 
plants operate under the so-called ―Special Regime‖ (RES LEGAL Europe, 2015). 
Plant operators may be contractually entitled to the expansion of the grid. If the expansion is 
required for a plant to be connected to the grid, the operator of the plant has to bear the costs of the 
expansion works (―deep‖ connection charges). Apart from that, the grid operator is obligated to expand 
his grid in compliance with the general legislation on energy (RES LEGAL Europe, 2015). 
Spain has a national training system for installers and an obligatory certification for solar thermal 
panels. In addition, there are two wider frameworks, the R&D plan and the building code, that include 
RES as an area of interest. 
As of February 2015, according to Forbes, the renewable energy industry in Spain is ―coming 
back from the dead‖. The Spanish Ministry of Industry said it would support installation of roughly 8.5 
gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy capacity between 2015 and 2020. The new capacity will increase 
Spain‘s total installed renewable energy capacity from 48 GW in 2015 to about 57 GW in 2020. More 
specifically, the initiative will support installation of nearly 6.5 GW of wind power capacity, 1.5 GW of 
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solar photovoltaic facilities and about 211 megawatts (MW) of solar thermal power plants. However, 
projects supported by the new programs will require financial guarantees from renewable energy 
developers. The reports indicated that renewables developers will be required to put forward financial 
guarantees for projects in order to access government subsidies - a move designed to guard against a 
rush of new projects that could exceed the subsidy budget (Forbes, 2015). 
The new target comes after the Spanish government controversially imposed retroactive 
changes to the country's renewable energy subsidy regime, responding to concerns about the scheme's 
cost by imposing a cap on the returns renewable energy project owners could realize. 
The policy u-turn had a dramatic impact on a renewables sector that had been one of the most 
vibrant in Europe, with official figures showing that new solar installations crashed from 105MW in 
2013 to just 7MW last year. New figures this week from the European Wind Energy Association 
similarly confirmed that Spain lagged well behind the leading European markets for new wind energy 
installations last year (BusinessGreen, 2015). 
Renewable Energy deployment in Spain has progressed rapidly in the past decade due to a 
convergence of several factors: a political will to meet the 2020 renewable energy and climate change 
objectives defined by the European Union, the existence of Research Centres that have spearheaded 
innovation and commercialization of renewable energy technologies as well as large amount of private 
sector investment. 
As a result, one third of Spain‘s electricity is generated from renewable sources. Spanish 
companies have also emerged as world leaders in a number of renewable energy technologies, notably 
wind power and concentrated solar. All this have been brought about by generous public funding 
schemes in R&D and early stage commercialization as well as fiscal and regulatory policies supportive 
of a rapid expansion of the renewable energy market. The European crisis has prompted significant 
policy changes that could jeopardize the continuity of existing support schemes and negatively affect 
the state of renewable energy in Spain (Australian National University, 2013). 
Summarizing, the growth in the use of Renewable Energies in Spain has been remarkable. 
Among these energies is solar thermal energy. Over recent years, various measures have been adopted 
to enhance and promote the use of solar thermal energy. These measures have been developed at all 
administrative levels: central, regional and local. One of the most used measures has been the adoption 
of legislative regulations that force the use of this type of energy in construction. Another alternative 
route is promotion by means of incentives, in three aspects: tax incentives, non-refundable grants and 
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favorable lines of finance. However, the measures applied have been found to be insufficient, and 





Europe's demand for energy is increasing in an environment of high and unstable energy prices. 
Greenhouse gas emissions are rising. Natural reserves of fossil fuels such as oil and gas are 
concentrated in just a few supplier countries around the world. The global oil market has become 
extremely volatile and particularly the EU dependence on oil continues to grow. The unreliability of the 
fossil fuels suppliers first of all regarding Russia creates threats to the European countries‘ energy 
security. Therefore, with more emphasis on renewable energy and using domestic renewable energy 
sources instead of importing foreign oil the EU would drastically improve its energy security and 
energy independence. 
Moreover, climate change along with an increasing dependency on energy imports are only a few 
of the risks the European economy is facing today. As energy is the fuel of the EU economic engine, by 
switching from fossil fuel, greenhouse gas intensive sources of energy to renewable sources of energy, 
the EU is able to fully grasp its sustainable potential - in economic, ecologic and social terms. 
Based on the abovementioned current energy security problems and benefits that could be 
obtained by using the renewable and alternative energy sources, this study investigated the EU past and 
present energy supply and consumption patterns with an emphasis on renewable and alternative energy 
supporting policies. Moreover, the role of renewable and alternative energy sources in the energy 
strategy of three EU Member States was analyzed in order to identify how wise government policies 
and encouraging incentives can have a real impact on the fortunes of attaining high energy security and 
efficiency. 
In addition to this, the paper aimed at verifying two hypotheses. First hypothesis as to whether 
the share of alternative and renewable energy will be sufficiently large to contribute to solving a 
problem of the EU energy security and independency has been confirmed. The dynamic and structural 
analysis of the renewable and alternative energy sources usage nowadays in the EU in general and its 
Member Countries considered separately demonstrated that the EU strives to ensure its energy security 
by setting ambitious long term horizon goals regarding the use of the renewables. Thus, under the 
European Union‘s 20/20/20 policy renewable electricity capacity has increased significantly in the past 
10 years. This growth, fuelled by political, economic and environmental imperatives, will see 
renewables continue to play an increasing role in the European energy mix over the next decade. 
Moreover, the analysis of targets set for 2030 and 2050 by the EU demonstrated the intention to 
dramatically increase the share of alternative sources in transport sector particularly, as well as share of 
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renewables in electricity and heating sectors of the EU. However, the analysis of the contractual 
obligations of the EU countries with Russia demonstrated that the process of replacement imported 
energy sources with alternative and renewable will take quite a long time, however the EU Member 
states work actively on that issue. Apart from implementing its environmental policies, the EU ensures 
the security and reliability of the energy sources supply of its Member States. 
The second hypothesis as to whether renewable energy sources will reduce dependency of the EU 
and its Member States on Russia and other fossil fuel exporters has also been partly validated. The 
analysis of the main EU import partners (with respect to fossil fuels) showed that many EU member 
countries are also heavily reliant on a single supplier, including some that rely entirely on Russia for 
their natural gas. This dependence leaves them vulnerable to supply disruptions, whether caused by 
political or commercial disputes, or infrastructure failure. Based on this evidence together with the 
analysis of alternative and renewable energy sources possibilities in the EU, the conclusion was drawn 
that the EU will highly benefit in terms of energy efficiency and, what is most important, energy 
security from its active supporting policies regarding the renewables. However, among the main 
finding of this paper was that there is limited scope for significantly reducing overall European 
dependence on Russian gas before the 2020s even though the targets set by the EU have chances to be 
met. 
Thus, in this study a comprehensive analysis of past and current trends of the EU energy market 
has been conducted. The role of renewable and alternative energy sources has been identified and 
explained in the context of current global and regional political and economic situation as well as 
environmental and social issues taken into account. Furthermore, a more thorough analysis of separate 
sectors of renewable energy sources, their supply and consumption as well as three EU Member 
Countries national energy markets and strategies was carried out. The objective of that was to evaluate 
how governmental policies support the renewables and what effects are obtained. As a result of this 
investigation, the following conclusion was reached: despite growing interest in promoting renewable 
energy, many support measures in Europe targeting fossil fuels and nuclear sectors are still in place, 
and continue to affect public budgets. 
Last but not least the EU long term goals with respect to the renewable energy sources were 
studied as well as some forecasts regarding the renewable sector future development. Based on the data 
from recent reports by various organizations related to energy sector, the conclusion was obtained that 
the EU is capable of reaching its goals set for 2020, 2030 and 2050, and its member countries work 
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Wind Power in the EU 
 
Table A1. Wind power penetration in the EU 
 
Total EU electricity consumption (TWh) 2,798 
Onshore wind energy production (TWh) 254.43 
Offshore wind energy production (TWh) 29.59 
Share of EU consumption met by onshore wind (TWh) 9.1% 
Share of EU consumption met by offshore wind 1.1% 
Share of EU consumption met by wind 10.2% 
 
This table represents wind power penetration levels, calculated using average capacity factors 








Fig.B1. Share of renewables in gross final energy consumption, 2012 and 2020 
Source: Eurostat 
 
  
 
